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INTRODUCTION
On April 13, 1998, the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Kofi Annan, issued a report entitled "The Causes of Conflict and the
Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa."' The report emphasized the important role democracy plays in
fostering "an environment where peace and development can flourish."2 Annan highlighted the need to strengthen and reinforce the
ability of African countries to operate peacekeeping missions and

1. The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 10 para. 77,
U.N. Doc. S/1998/318 (1998).
2. Id. paras. 41-45; see Agenda For Democratization: Report of the Secretary
General, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 41 paras. 1- 14, U.N. Doc A/51/761
(1996) (stressing the importance of democracy in the stniggle to obtain peace).
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carry out forceful actions within a framework of regional or subregional initiatives?
While a number of African states struggle with political instability,
economic stagnation, and cultural disunity,' events in some African
countries suggest a fragile hope for the future.5 One such event is the
recent reinstatement of the democratically elected president of Sierra
Leone.6 In May 1997, military forces ousted President Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah from power and, in the following year, Kabbah became the
first democratically elected African leader restored to power through
military intervention. Significantly, Kabbah returned to power as the
result of actions by a West African regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS").) The
events in Sierra Leone and the reactions of the international community indicate the increasing pressures pushing African states toward
democratization and raise a host of issues under international law.
This article evaluates the international legal aspects of the
ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone and the possible consequences of the intervention for traditional concepts of international
law. As the situation in Sierra Leone suggests, the concept of governmental legitimacy has been fundamentally altered in the postCold War era. 9 In the post-Cold War international system, states ap3. See The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, supra note 1, paras. 41-45, see also UN. Security
Council Resolution 1170, U.N. SCOR, 3886th mtg. para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1170

(1998).
4. See A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of InternationalLaw in the Twenn-First
Centuiy: An African Perspective, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1706, 1712 (1995).
5. See id. (commenting on the active role many African states have played in
global conferences and summit meetings in recent years).
6. See Howard French, Nigerians Take Capital of Sierra Leone as Junta
Flees, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1998, at A3.
7. See Sierra Leone: Putting a Countn Together Again, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21,
1998, at 44 (noting the difficult task of building a national force out of an untrustworthy army upon Kabbah's return to power).
8. See James Rupert, Nigerians Welconed in Freetown, WASH. POST, Feb. 15,
1998, at A27 (reporting that Nigerian troops were sent to Sierra Leone under Economic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS") authority).
9. See FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 225 (1997) (ob-

serving that awareness of the link between human rights and peace has produced a
change of opinion concerning humanitarian intervention and governmental legiti-
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pear increasingly willing to accept military interventions to restore
democracy even though, under traditional legal analysis, such interventions may lack legal justification.'0 This article also discusses the
implications of the intervention in Sierra Leone for the future role of
regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and
security in general, and in particular, the role in Africa. Although Africa is often viewed as a continent that is the recipient of, rather than
a contributor to, the development of international law," its recent
contribution to the development of international legal norms governing regional enforcement actions is significant. 2
Part I provides a factual background to the events leading to the
ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone. Part II examines the international legal rules governing ECOWAS and its intervention. Part III
focuses on the legality of ECOWAS actions in Sierra Leone following the coup d'tat and examines whether the intervention, despite its
purpose of restoring democracy, falls within the prohibition on the
use of force pursuant to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
Additionally, the analysis focuses on whether ECOWAS's use of
force is justified under international law. A number of possible justifications for the intervention are evaluated, particularly, authorization by the Security Council, the right of self-defense, the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, and the right to restore democracy based
on the consent of the legitimate government. This article reveals that,
given a paradigmatic shift in the concept of legitimate government
since the end of the Cold War, the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra
Leone is justified by the request of the democratically elected President-In-Exile for foreign military assistance.
Finally, Part IV examines the benefits and problems associated
with the use of regional organizations for the resolution of civil conflicts. Using the example of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group
("ECOMOG") actions in West Africa, this article concludes that alinacy).
10. See id. at 227-58 (providing examples of interventions in Haiti, Rwanda,
and Somalia).
11. See Mutharika, supra note 4, at 1719 (suggesting that the marginalization
of Africa has led to this "recipient" status).
12. See id. at 1712 (pointing to Africa's participation in global summit diplomacy in the mid-1990s).
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though the development of effective regional organizations benefits
the international community, these organizations must operate under
the authorization and watch of the United Nations to remain effective
and acceptable under international law.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 25, 1997, soldiers in Sierra Leone seized power, overthrowing the fourteen-month old civilian government of President
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah." The rebel soldiers of the Revolutionary
United Front ("RUF") forced President Kabbah into exile in neighboring Guinea and established themselves as Sierra Leone's new
government. 4 Although the coup d'6tat received relatively little attention from the international press, in West Africa the event commanded attention as cutting short one of West Africa's "most promising political evolutions."'"
Sierra Leone has long struggled with authoritarian, oppressive
governance.16 From its days as a British colony, through successive
military rulers brought to power by four coups, the people of Sierra
Leone know well the costs of political instability. The country is one
of the world's poorest, with an average per capita income of S150
per year. The elections that placed Kabbah, a former lawyer, in the
President's Palace were the first free elections in Sierra Leone in
over thirty years.'7
Kabbah came to power in March 1996 and quickly won the favor
of Sierra Leoneans and West African statesmen for his role in ending
a five year civil war with the RUF. The Abidjan Accord, signed on
13. See James Rupert, Civilian Rule Overturned in Sierra Leone, WASH. POST,
May 26, 1997, at A21 (explaining the tactics employed by Revolutionary United
Front ("RUF") soldiers).
14. See Claudia McElroy, Soldiers Topple Government in Sierra Leone,
GUARDIAN, May 26, 1997, at 13 (reporting the soldiers' seizure of parliament,
government offices at the state house, and radio and television stations).
15. Rupert, supra note 13, at A21.
16. See id. (describing the history of authoritarianism in Sierra Leone).
17. See id. (describing Kabbah's election as president as one of West Africa's
most promising political evolutions).
18. See James Rupert, NigeriansDrive Juntafrom Sierra Leone, WASH. POST,
Feb. 14, 1998, at A23 (explaining that Major Johnny Paul Koromah, head of the
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November 30, 1996, declared an immediate end to the armed conflict, provided for the demobilization of RUF forces, and set forth
political provisions whereby the RUF would register and function as
a political party.' " In addition, the Abidjan Accord called for the deployment of neutral international observers and a "capable security
presence" to "deter undisciplined elements" from interrupting the
peace process.2 0 Kabbah's government indicated to the United Nations that it did not have the means to ensure an adequate security
presence.' In January 1997, United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan proposed a peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone to "aid in
the implementation of the Abidjan Accord."22 The eight-month plan
included "720 troops, 60 military observers,
and 276 civilian staff, at
23
an estimated total cost of $47 million.,
The Secretary General's report, however, was never adopted. 2'
Reports indicate that Security Council members felt the operation
would not gain the support of the United States.25 Specifically, Security Council members felt the Clinton administration would be loath
to engage in a new peacekeeping operation in Africa while in the
midst of "delicate negotiations with Congress on the payment of $1
billion in arrears. 26
Without supervisory presence to ensure enforcement, the Abidjan
Accord began to unravel when RUF rebels failed to disarm and de-

RUF, and former Sierra Leonean soldiers joined with the rural rebel group, RUF,
to form the junta).
19. See Report of the Secretaiy-General on Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 52d
Sess., paras. 5-7, U.N. Doc. S/I 997/80 (1997).
20. See id. para. 26.
21. See id. para. 27 (detailing the United Nations plan to send a mission of both
armed and unarmed soldiers to ensure adequate security presence).
22. Id. para 1.
23. Id.
24. See Mark Tran & Claudia McElroy, U.N. Failure in Sierra Leone Feeds
Recriminations: Foreigners Await Rescue as Nigeria Sends Troops to Reverse
Coup, GUARDIAN, May 29, 1997, at 15 (noting that "Mr. Anan's report... has
been gathering dust since January").
25. See id.
26. Id.
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mobilize according to schedule. 7 Soldiers in Sierra Leone's national
army, frustrated by unpaid wages and perceived ethnic favoritism,
began to support the rebels. 2 Tensions exploded on May 25, 1997,
when soldiers seized government buildings and freed armed prisoners from Freetown's main jail .- Notably, the prisoners freed by RUF
forces included the head of the RUF, Major Johnny Paul Koromah.
Koromah quickly declared himself head of the new government, suspended the constitution, and banned all political parties.'
Sierra Leone's struggles with democracy were watched closely by
its West Africa neighbor, Nigeria."' Since 1990, during the darkest
days of Sierra Leone's civil war, Nigerian troops, operating through
the ECOWAS, have been present in Sierra Leone.' 2 When the RUF
staged the coup d'ktat, Nigeria responded by sending more troops
and engaging in full-fledged military combat with the rebels." From
exile in Guinea, President Kabbah invited Nigeria to take military
action in order to overturn the coup d'6tat.'4 A week after the coup
d' tat, Nigerian warships commenced heavy shelling of Freetown,
specifically targeting rebel-held locations. Ultimately, military efforts failed, and Nigerian troops were forced to withdraw."
27. See Rupert, supra note 13, at A21 (describing RUF leaders' failure to attend the scheduled demobilization and the continued acts of violence designed to
undercut the peace accord).
28. See id. (reporting that soldiers resorted to looting as a result of frustration
with low wages).
29. See id.

30. See id.
31. See Gerard Vanderberghe, West African Troops Join Attack on Liberian
Faction, CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 19 (stating that Nigeria provided the
largest contingent of troops in the ECOWAS force).
32. For example, during Sierra Leone's 1997 democracy struggle, Nigerian
troops guarded the international airport in Freetown, the state house, and the presidential complex. See McElroy, supra note at 14, at 13.
33. See Rupert, supra note 8, at A27 (stating that periodic attacks launched by
Nigerian troops resulted in some civilian casualties).
34. See Anthony Goldman, Humiliated Nigerian Army Retires Hurt: Botched
Intervention in Sierra Leone Has Left the Military Regime Morally Erposed, FIN.
TIMES, June 4, 1997, at 3 ("There is complete anarchy in the country. Somebody
needs to restore law and order .. ").
35. See id. (explaining that Nigerian ground troops could not defend against the
alliance between government troops and former rebels).
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The Organization of African Unity ("OAU") swiftly condemned
the coup d'6tat in Sierra Leone and called for the restoration of democracy.36 The United Nations Security Council, however, did not
act as rapidly. Five months after the coup d'itat, the Security Council passed Resolution 1132, requesting the military junta to "relinquish power" and allow the "restoration of the democratically elected
government. 37 Although the Security Council found that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and
security in the region, the Security Council stopped short of authorizing military intervention.38 Instead, it authorized the imposition of
sanctions against the regime, prohibiting the sale of petroleum, arms,
and military equipment to the RUF junta."'
The Security Council
authorized ECOWAS to ensure the "strict implementation" of the
sanctions, but again stopped short of authorizing the use of force by
ECOWAS in implementing the provisions of the Resolution.
While the Security Council debated appropriate responses to the
coup d'6tat, West Africans attempted to negotiate an end to the
RUF's illegitimate regime. After numerous breakdowns and impasses, the negotiations eventually bore fruit. In October 1997, representatives of Major Koromah and President Kabbah signed a peace
agreement in Conakry, Guinea. 4' The Conakry Agreement set out a
peace plan for Sierra Leone and a six-month timetable for its imple-

36. See Andrew Meldrum, Annan and OAU Leaders Endorse Intervention
against 'Usurpers', GUARDIAN, June 3, 1997, at 14 (explaining that both the OAU
and Kofi Annan supported Nigeria's assault on Freetown); see also Howard W.
French, Nigeria, Set Back by Sierra Leone Rebels, Flies in More Troops, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 1997, at A7 (noting that "one OAU delegate after another supported
Nigeria's efforts").
37. S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3822 mtg. para. 1, U.N. Doe.

S/RES/1 132 (1997).
38. See id. para. 4 (encouraging ECOWAS to search for a peaceful end to the
crisis).
39. See id. para. 8 (calling for ship inspections to verify cargo and final destinations).
40. See id.
41. See Second Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Situation in Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess. paras. 2, 25, U.N. Doc. S/1997/958 (1997) (treating the
signing of the Agreement as a significant step towards resolving the crisis in Sierra
Leone).
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mentation.42 Under the agreement, rebels were to begin demobilizing
and disarming immediately, and Kabbah was to be restored as President of Sierra Leone no later than April 22, 1998."'
The six-month clock governing the Conakry Agreement began
ticking on October 23, 1997." By late 1997, however, it became
clear that the peace process was not progressing according to schedule.4 ' RUF rebels resisted disarmament and fighting continued in the
countryside. 46 By early 1998, guerrilla activity against the junta were
intense, particularly around the rural centers of Kenema and Bo.' An
organization known as the Civil Defense Unit ("CDU"), comprised
of a rural militia known as the "Kamajors" and traditional villagebased fighters, escalated their activities against the junta forces." As
military activities continued, the humanitarian situation in the rural
areas, particularly around the southern town of Bo, deteriorated. In
February 1998, the United Nations Special Envoy to Sierra Leone
reported critical food shortages and a rising number of attacks on civilians. 49 By this time it was clear that the Conakry Agreement alone
would not bringing peace to Sierra Leone.5'
On February 13, 1998, with two months remaining for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement timetable, Nigerian troops

42. See id. para. 3.

43. See id.
44. See id. (providing that ECOWAS Military Observer Group ("ECOMOG")
will monitor all parties involved to ensure adherence to the timetable).
45. See id. paras. 14-16 (noting that the junta appears to be hesitant to negotiate
the implementation of the Conarky Agreement).
46. See Third Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone,
U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess. para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/1998/103 (1998) (explaining findings
by the technical survey team that the security situation in the countryside remained
highly volatile).
47. See id. (describing intensified guerilla-type actions employed by the Civil
Defense Unit ("CDU") against the junta).
48. See id. (noting that the CDU obtained control of all major roads in Sierra
Leone).
49. See id.
50. See id. paras. 32-41 (stressing the need for assistance and support from the
entire international community in the implementation of the Agreement).
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captured Freetown, and ousted Koromah's government." Nigeria's
actions were no surprise to those in the region. For months, Nigerian
troops in neighboring Liberia armed, trained, and supported the Kamajors in their civil war against the junta.52 The fall of Freetown
marked the end of a nine-day full military offensive by the Nigerian
forces, which operated nominally under the auspices of ECOMOG.5'
Nigerian forces captured junta military leaders, but Koromah apparently escaped the country and fled to Guinea.14 Sierra Leoneans welcomed Nigeria's intervention and reacted with joy to the overthrow
of Koromah's regime.5
The international community accepted the Nigerian actions in Sierra Leone, apparently willing to turn a blind eye to legality of the
intervention." The OAU welcomed Nigeria's actions almost immediately.57 The United Nations Security Council issued a statement
welcoming "the fact that the military junta has been brought to an
end" and commended "the important role" that the ECOWAS played
in the "peaceful resolution" of the crisis."
On March 10, 1998, President Kabbah returned to power in Sierra
Leone and became the first democratically elected African leader to
be restored through the use of force.59 Nine of the fifteen members of
the new cabinet served under Kabbah before the May 1997 coup

51. See Rupert, supra note 18, at A23.
52. See Howard French, A West Africa Border with Back-to-Back Wars, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1998, at 3.

53. See Rupert, supra note 18, at A23 (explaining overthrow of the coup d'6tat
by the Nigerian offensive nine months prior).
54. See Ousted Sierra Leonean Junta Leader Sighted, XINHAU ENG.
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2793516 (stating that Koromah
escaped by wearing a false beard and posing as a priest).
55. See Rupert, supra note 8, at A27 (describing Freetown residents' warm
welcome of Nigerian troops and local praise for the ECOMOG).
56. SierraLeone: Puttinga Country Together, supra note 7, at 44 (arguing that
Nigerians did not have a proper mandate to intervene in Sierra Leone).
57. See id. (noting that OAU has nominal control of ECOMOG).
58. See Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 53d

Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1998/5 (1998).
59. See French, supra note 6,at A3 (discussing the details of President Kabbah's return to power).
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d'tat.60 On March 16, 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1556, welcoming Kabbah's return to power and partly terminating the sanctions imposed by Resolution 1132."'
Although a democratically elected government again governs Sierra Leone, the wounds of the civil war have yet to heal.2 The security situation remains tense in many of the rural areas, and factions
loyal to Koromah pose a threat to the fragile peace.' In its resolution
of April 17, 1998, the Security Council authorized the deployment of
up to ten military liaison and security advisory personnel to work
with the government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG to design a disarmament plan and identify former combatants to be disarmed.'
Most recently, the situation in Sierra Leone has again deteriorated,
with renewed violence spreading throughout the country." RUF soldiers, operating under the code name "No Living Thing" are trying to
regain power by capturing rural areas through a campaign of violence and gross violations of human rights. On June 13, 1998, the
Security Council passed Resolution 1181 condemning the "continued
resistance of the ousted junta and members of the RUF to the authority of the legitimate government," and demanding that the rebels "lay

60. See SierraLeone Names Downsized Post-Junta Cabinet, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Mar. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2246083 (listing cabinet positions
and the newly elected cabinet members).
61. See S.C. Res. 1156, U.N. SCOR, 52 Sess., 3861st mtg. para. 2 U.N. Doc.
S/RES 1556 (1998) (terminating the prohibitions on the sale and supply of petroleum to Sierra Leone).
62. See James Rupert, SierraLeone Rebels Accused of Atrocities, WASH. POST,
May 14, 1998, at A27 (describing resistance of junta forces to Nigerian efforts to
secure the countryside).
63. See id. (detailing the killings and mutilation of civilians by junta forces);
see also Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 52d
Sess., 3882d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. SIPRST/1998/P3 (1998); U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1171, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3889th mtg. paras 1-9, U.N. Doc. SIRES
1171 (1998) (condemning the "continued resistance to the authority of the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone").
64. See U.N. Security Council Resolution 1162, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3872d
mtg. para. 5 U.N. Doc. S/RES/l 162 (1998).
65. See Barbara Crossette, In West Africa, a Grisly Ertension of Rebel Terror,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at Al (describing the rebel "campaign of butchery"
against civilians).
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down their arms immediately. 66 RUF soldiers continue, however, to
terrorize rural communities with violence. The Sierra Leonean government estimates that over 1,000 people have had limbs amputated
by the RUF since the junta was forced from power."

II. THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST
AFRICAN STATES
In overthrowing the illegitimate Kabbah regime, Nigerian troops
acted under the auspices of the ECOWAS.68 Although ECOWAS has
served increasingly as a military force in West Africa,69 its founders
envisioned an economic community similar to the European Community.70 In May 1975, the Treaty of the Economic Community of
West African States entered into force, creating a community of
States covering most of West Africa.' The founding aims of
ECOWAS are to "promote co-operation and development in all
fields of economic activity, particularly in the fields of industry,
transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources,
commerce, monetary and financial questions, and in social and cultural matters., 72 The founding ECOWAS treaty contained no provisions concerning the establishment of a multinational military force.7 '

66. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1181, U.N. SCOR, 3902d mtg. para. I,
U.N. Doc. S/RES 1181 (1998).
67. See James Rupert, Sierra Leone Endures Machete's Edge, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 1998, at Al.
68. Since 1990, ECOWAS troops have been stationed in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, playing a critical role in the Liberian civil war. See Rupert, supra note
62, at A27.
69. See generally Herbert Howe, Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional
Peace Keeping, in 21:3 INT'L SECURITY 145, 154-60 (1996) (describing the military history of ECOWAS).
70. See Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), May 28, 1975, 1010 U.N.T.S. 17, 14 I.L.M. 1200 (1975) (describing
the intended role of ECOWAS in West African peacekeeping).
71. Original ECOWAS signatories were Benin, Gambia, Ghana, GuineaBissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). See id.
72. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
supra note 70.
73. See id.

1998]

MILITARY INTER VENTION IN SIERR4 LEONE

Indeed, in 1978, the ECOWAS members signed a Protocol on NonAggression calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes within the
Community. 4
In 1981, however, ECOWAS members entered into a Protocol
Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense, which established the
multinational ECOWAS defense force.'5 The Protocol envisioned a
defense force authorized to act in cases of armed conflict between
two or more members and "in cases of internal armed conflict within
any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside
likely to endanger the security and peace of the entire Community. '
In both cases, intervention is permitted only when the head of state
of the member concerned submits a written request to ECOWAS
authorities.77 The Protocol explicitly states that "Community forces
shall not intervene if the conflict remains purely intemal."' As well
as authorizing military intervention under certain strict guidelines,
the Protocol establishes a command structure to implement its provisions.79

The Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence remained
untested until the Liberian civil war in the early 1990s."" When civil

74. See Georg Nolte, Restoring Peace b"Regional Action: InternationalLegal
Aspects of the Liberian Conflict, in 53 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLNDISCHES
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 603, 613 (1993) (citing Protocol on
Non-Aggression of ECOWAS (Apr. 22, 1978)) (stating that the Protocol is "based
on the consideration that the organisation [ECOWAS] could not attain its objectives without the establishment of a peaceful atmosphere").
75. See Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, U.N. Doc.
A/SP3/5/81, available in 4 NIGERIA'S TREATIES IN FORCE 898 (1990) (reasoning
that the "external defence" of member states will be more effective with the coordination and mutual assistance of other member states).
76. Id. art. 4.
77. See id. art. 16 (explaining that a written request indicates proper notification of ECOWAS authority and placement of ECOWAS forces under a state of
emergency).
78. Id. art. 18.
79. See id. art. 12.
80. See Nolte, supra note 74, at 613; Kofi Oteng Kufuor, The Legalit" o intervention in the Liberian Civil War b" the Economic Commnnity of West African
States, 5 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 525 (1993); B.G. Ramcharan, Cooperation
between the U.N. and Regional/Sub-RegionalOrganizationsin Internal Conflicts:
The Case of Liberia, 4 AFR. Y.B. INr-'L L. 3 (1996).
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war erupted in Liberia in 1990, no ECOWAS member had committed troops to serve under the common defense force.8' When
ECOMOG forces landed in Liberia in August 1990, the forces operated under the Chairmanship of ECOWAS, and not within the institutional framework established by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance
on Defence.8 2 ECOMOG troops, comprised largely of Nigerians, remained active in Liberia through the Liberian elections in July
1997.83

The Nigerian troops intervened in Sierra Leone under the auspices
of ECOWAS and served, technically, as ECOMOG troops.8" Many
observers in the region, however, considered the intervention a Nigerian action and the international media reported the overthrow of the
junta as a Nigerian victory. 5 Nevertheless, the United Nations and
the OAU accepted the intervention as an ECOWAS action.86

III. THE LEGALITY OF ECOWAS ACTIONS IN
SIERRA LEONE
The legality of ECOMOG's actions in Sierra Leone must be measured according to applicable rules of international law, particularly the
international legal norms governing the use of force between states. 7

81. See Nolte, supra note 74, at 606-08 (explaining ECOWAS's initial attempts
to resolve the conflict through peaceful negotiations).
82. See id. (noting that ECOWAS, not the United Nations Security Council,
authorized the intervention).
83. See Statement by the Presidentof the Security Council: The Situation in Liberia, U.N. SCOR, 3805th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1997/41 (1997) (discussing the presence of troops in Liberia from August 1990 through July 1997).
84. See Rupert, supra note 62, at A27.
85. See French, supra note 6, at A3. Critics of Nigeria's own military government see the intervention as a means to divert international attention away from
Nigeria's unpopular military leader, General Sani Abacha, and as a thinly veiled
play for Sierra Leone's mineral wealth. See A. Bolaji Akinyemi, End the Military
Meddling, GUARDIAN, June 5, 1997, at 21.
86. See United Nations Press Release, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6481 AFRI44 (Mar.
10, 1998) (reporting that the overthrow of the military junta accomplishes "a major
objective... of the Economic Community of West African States").
87. See THOMAS EHRLICH & MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE 157 (1993) (describing the sources of international law re-

lating to the use of force).
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Specifically, the legality of the intervention to restore the democratically elected government of President Kabbah must be weighed in
light of the general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter and the broader principle of nonintervention, recognized under customary international law."
A. ECOMOG ACTION TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY IN SIERRA
LEONE AND THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter explicitly prohibits
Member States from threatening or using force against other states."
ECOMOG troops clearly adopted aggressive military measures
against another state. 90The shelling of Freetown by Nigerian warships
and planes and the attack on Sierra Leonean soldiers with ground
troops 9' undoubtedly represents a use of force envisioned by Article
2(4).92 Thus, there appears to be sufficient grounds to conclude that
these measures fall within the scope of this United Nations Charter

88. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.

v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106 (June 27); Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949
I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (explaining that the alleged right of intervention cannot find a
place in international law); see also I SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR ARTHUR
WATrS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 428-29 (9th ed. 1997); MALCOLM N.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 797 (4th ed. 1997).

89. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The United Nations Security Council had
the responsibility of implementing and enforcing Article 2. See EHRLICH &
O'CONNELL, supra note 87, at 305.
90. See Definition of Aggression Resolution, Annex, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX
1974) (stating that "[t]he first use of armed force by a state in contravention of the
Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression").
91. See James Rupert, Nigerian Navy Shells Sierra Leone Rebels; Vove Draws
Counterattackin Capital,WASH. POST, June 3, 1997, at A13 (describing the Nigerian attack on Freetown after rebels overthrew the government). Significantly, the
goal of the Nigerian-led effort was to force the rebels to surrender. See id.
92. The discussion whether Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter encompasses only armed force or is also applicable to economic coercion is therefore not
relevant in the analysis of this case. For an overview of this problem, see Albrecht
Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A
COMMENTARY 106, 112 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (reviewing the question
of whether Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter encompasses only armed
force, or is also applicable to other contexts, such as economic conversion).
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provision.93 Article 2(4), however, requires Member States to refrain
from the threat or use of force only in cases where it is used "against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. '
The formulation of this provision suggests that Article 2(4) is not an
absolute prohibition on the use of force. 95 Because the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone sought to restore the democratically elected
government, questions arise as to whether ECOMOG's military actions fall beyond the reach of the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of
force.96

It has been argued that Article 2(4) must be read to prohibit only
those military measures that are accompanied by a specific intent to7
violate the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.
Some authors suggest that force aimed at restoring a democratically
elected government does not fall within the scope of the prohibition on
the use of force contained in Article 2(4).9 These authors argue that
such interventions are not undertaken with the intent to annex another
state's territory and, thus, do not threaten a state's territorial integrity. ""
93. See EHRLICH & O'CONNELL, supra note 87, at 305 (noting that the United
Nations General Assembly drafted the definition of aggression in response to the
debate surrounding Article 2(4)). Specifically, the definition of aggression describes those state actions, which are prohibited uses of force. See id.
94. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4. For a detailed discussion of Article 2(4), see
Randelzholfer, supra note 92, at 106-28.
95. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 162 (1950) (stating that
"if force can be used in a manner which does not threaten the territorial integrity or
political independence of a state, it escapes the restriction of the first clause").
96. See id. at 158 (noting that justifications for war have frequently been placed
on high political aspirations and ideals).
97. See Argumentation of the United Kingdom Agent, Sir Eric Beckett, before
the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Corfu Channel) 264, 296
(Nov. 11, 1948); see also D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
152 (1958).
98. See FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY
INTO LAW AND MORALITY 151 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that the use of force to
overthrow "despotic regimes" cannot be prohibited).
99. See Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawfid Response to
Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 520 (1990) (stating that "there was never an intent to annex part or all of Panamanian territory, and hence, the intervention left
the territorial integrity of Panama intact"); see also Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J.
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Furthermore, pro-democratic interventions do not violate the political
independence of a state." ° Rather, interventions to restore democratically elected governments support the political independence of a state
by enforcing the nation's political will and sovereignty, which was
violated by the overthrow of the government."" Thus, pro-democratic
interventions are consistent with the purposes of the United Nations as
they seek to further human rights'0 2 in accordance with the Preamble
and Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, as well as principles of
self-determination.' 3
Article 2(4)'s exclusion of pro-democratic interventions is further
supported by the teleological argument that democracies do not attack

163, 167 (1993).
100. See TESON, supra note 98, at 150 (stating that the use of force is banned
when its use impairs territorial integrity, affects political independence, or goes
against the purposes of the United Nations).
101. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporarv
International Law, 84 AM. J.INT'L L. 866, 873 (1990) (citing claims of the Nicaraguan Permanent Representative to the United Nations that the both the United
Nations and OAS Charters establish "a flagrant violation of Panama's sovereignty
and territorial integrity"); see also Lois E. Fielding, Taking tile Next Step in the
Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J.COMP. & INT'L L. 329, 374 (1995) (observing that sovereignty is derived from the will of the people. therefore, sovereignty does not belong to the ruler and, consequently, the ruler can actually violate
state sovereignty).
102. For the discussion about an evolving human right to democratic governance, see, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); Gregory H. Fox, The Right of Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992) (explaining the
manner in which domestic democratic developments are affecting traditional concepts of state sovereignty in international law). See also Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?.,
27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 289 (1995) (arguing that democracy has achieved
universal recognition as an international legal right).
103. See W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Deternination: Constnting
Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J.INT'L L. 642, 643 (1984) (noting that "the basic
policy of contemporary international law has been to maintain the political independence of territorial communities so that they can continue to express their desire for political community in a form appropriate to them"); see also Robert F.
Turner, Haiti and the Growth of a Democract) Entitlement, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AT FIFTY-SOVEREIGNTY, PEACEKEEPING, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 18, 25
(Don M. Snider et al. eds., 1995); Jeanne Kirkpatrick, DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2081,
Dec. 1983, p. 74; Halberstam, supra note 99, at 167.
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each other and are less likely to wage war.'" The fundamental purpose
of Article 2(4), when read with the Preamble and Article 1(1) of the
United Nations Charter, is the maintenance of international peace.,05 If
democracy is viewed as a conditio sine qua non of peaceful relations
among states, 106 the United Nations Charter provision on the prohibition of the use of force may be interpreted as excluding "prodemocratic" interventions in its scope.107

104. For further discussion on this argument, see Immanuel Kant's explanations
of his First Definitive Article in IMMANUEL KANT, ETERNAL PEACE, 76 (W. Hastie
& Edwin D. Mead, eds., 1914); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and
Foreign Affairs (pts. 1-2), 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 323 (1983). See also Lori
Fisler Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism,36 COLUM, J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 449, 454 (1997) (tracing the roots of the theory linking constitutional organization to international peace).
105. See ANTONIO CASSESE, THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF
FORCE 3 (1986) (explaining that the United Nations Organization and its proclaimed purpose in Articles 1(2) and 2(4) are primarily "an attempt to institute a
regime of collective peace enforcement").
106. In addition to the argument of war avoidance through democratization, democracy is also closely linked to other important policy goals such as the protection of human rights, economic development, and environmental protection. See
W. Michael Reisman, HumanitarianInterventions and Fledgling Democracies, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794, 804 (1995) (stating that "[d]emocracy is a right guaranteed by international law and the condition sine qua non for the realization of many
other internationally prescribed human rights"); see also Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective HumanitarianIntervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323, 332 (1996) (detailing
reasons to doubt the conclusion that international law should be concerned with
democratic legitimacy). These include; the question of agency, grounds for believing democratic rule to be a necessary condition for other human rights, and the
democratic peace thesis. See id. In addition to the argument of war avoidance
through democratization, democracy is also closely linked to other important policy goals, such as, the protection of human rights, economic development, and environmental protection. For further analysis of this proposition, see John Norton
Moore, Towards a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in United Nations
Peacekeeping, Collective Security, and War Avoidance, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 811,
833, 826 (1997) (noting that this link suggests "a multiplicity of reasons to support
democratic structures").
107. See Reisman, supra note 103, at 644 (describing various constructions of
Article 2(4)); D'Amato, supra note 99, at 520 (submitting that the use of force for
territorial aggrandizement or colonialism does not qualify as humanitarian intervention); see also Richard B. Lillich, Kant and the Current Debate over Humnanitarian Intervention, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 397, 402 (1997) (interpreting
Kant as supportive of the argument for humanitarian intervention to protect human
rights).

1998]

MILITARY INTER VENTION IN SIERR4 LEONE

339

A legal construction excluding the use of force for "benign ends""'
from the scope of Article 2(4), however, raises serious issues conceming the interpretation of the prohibition of force, which is considered "the cornerstone of peace in the Charter.""' These concerns are
not based on the character of inventions seeking to restore democratically elected government, but on the fear that any exception to the
prohibition will create the possibility of a "legion of loopholes'"' in
the norm and leave it vulnerable to abuse."' Making exceptions for
"higher values," Oscar Schachter points out, may lead to a dilution of
the norm to a point where "it could have no application except in the
unlikely case of an announced aggression."" 2 Such a narrow reading
108. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mtcit. L.
REv. 1620, 1626 (1984) (noting that the use of force to achieve a "benign end"
does not fall within the scope of Article 2(4)). The International Court of Justice,
for example, answered this question in the Corfu Channel Case of 1949 by rejecting the British claim that it has used minesweeping to vindicate legal rights. See iL
109. Humphrey M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Indivihal
States in InternationalLaw, 81 RECUEIL DES COURs 451, 492 (1852 11);
see generally Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971) (calling Article 2(4) "the heart of the United
Nations Charter"); JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 414 (Sir Humphrey
Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (declaring Article 2(4) as the "cornerstone of the
Charter system").
110. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 85 (2d ed.
1994) (arguing that the injunction against resort to force in international relations
should not be confined to specific situations affecting the territorial and political
independence of states). Another author suggests that:
[Slituations may arise in which attempts to settle disputes by peaceful means may be
so delayed, and prospects of success so fantastically remote, that a minimal regard for
law and justice in interstate-state relations might require the use of force in due time to
vindicate these standards, and avoid even more catastrophic resort to force at a later
stage ....
JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 43 (1958).
111. See Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 291, 294 (1985); see also. M. K. Nawaz, 1i'hat Limits to the Use
of Force: Can Forcebe Used to Depose an Oppressive Government?, 24 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 406, 410 (1984).
112. Oscar Schachter, Is There a Right to Overthrow an Illegitimate Regime?, in
LE DROrr INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU

DEVELOPPEMENT-MELANGES MICHEL VIRALLY 423, 427 (1991); see LOUIS
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 145 (2d ed. 1979) (noting that even intervention
for humanitarian purposes can all too readily be used as a pre-text for aggression);
Sarah A. Rumage, Panama and the Myth of HumanitarianIntervention in U.S.
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of Article 2(4), excluding military measures undertaken by states for a
variety of purposes from the scope of this provision, cannot control
when the accepted rules of interpretation of international treaties,"'
which apply to the United Nations Charter, are employed." 4
The wording of Article 2(4) is ambiguous." 5 The language concerning territorial integrity and political independence may be understood as restricting the scope of the prohibition on the use of force." 6
Alternatively, territorial integrity and political independence may simply explicate particularly egregious violations of the prohibition, in order to strengthen the guarantee against foreign military intervention."'
In that case, the last clause functions as "a residual 'catch-all' provision.""' 8 Given this ambiguity in Article 2(4), alternative methods of
interpretation, such as a systematic interpretation of the treaty, its purpose, and the travauxpr~paratoires,should be considered." 9
Foreign Policy: Neither Legal nor Moral, Neither Just nor Right, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1, 27 (1993).
113. See Nawaz, supra note 111, at 409.
114. For further interpretations of the United Nations Charter, see Georg Ress,
Interpretation, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONs-A COMMENTARY 25
(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (detailing the Charter's legal position, interpretation in light of the Vienna Convention, and its revision); Pollux, The Interpretation
of the Charter,23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 54 (1946); Krysztof Skubizewski, Remarks
on the Interpretation of the United Nations Charter, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR
HERMANN MOSLER 891 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1983).
115. See CASSESE, supra note 105, at 3 (commenting on the various differences
of opinion concerning the scope and content of Charter provisions).
116. See id. at 4 (observing that only certain specified types of force are proscribed by the Charter "namely, force directed against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or force inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations").
117. See Ian Brownlie, InternationalLaw at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
United Nations, 255 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 199 (1995).
118. Manfred Lachs, The Development and General Trends of International
Law in Our Time, 169 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 162 (1980 IV).
119. See Ress, supra note 114, at 30 (discussing the interpretation of the United
Nations Charter and the rules of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties). The
methods of treaty interpretation are codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, arts.
31-33, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. In accordance with Article 4 of the Convention, it
is applicable only to treaties concluded after the Vienna Convention entered into
force on January 27, 1980, and thus not to the United Nations Charter. Nonetheless, the general principles of treaty interpretation apply because of their status as
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Under the systematic method of interpretation, the meaning of the
norm is ascertained by comparison with other norms set forth in the
treaty and by referencing the entire structure of the treaty.': The first
section of the Preamble of the United Nations Charter, which sheds an
interpretive light on the ensuing provisions 2 ' refers to the goal of
"sav[ing] succeeding generations from the scourge of war....
Furtherance of this goal requires "that armed force shall not be used,
save in the common interest....

."'I"Article

1 defines the purpose of

the United Nations and characterizes the Organization as a system of
collective security, which holds a general prohibition on the use of
force as its central tenant. 2 This tenant is also expressed in Article 24,
under which Member States confer primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security upon the Security
Council.'2 Reviewing these provisions, it is possible to conclude that

customary international law. See JENNINGS & WATTS,supra note 88, at 1271.
120. Ress, supra note 114, at 43 (discussing systematic interpretation in both the
narrow and broad context). For an application of the principle of systematic interpretation see Case Concerning Border and Transborder Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.),
1988 I.C.J. 69, 94 (Dec. 20); Advisory Opinion No. 13, Competence of the International Labor Organization to Regulate, Incidentally, the Personal Work of the
Employer, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 13, at 23.
121. See Riidiger Wolfrum, Preamble, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONs-A COMMENTARY 45, 48 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (discussing
the function of preambles in the interpretation of international treaties). To this
end, the Preamble serves "as an interpretive guideline for the provisions of the
Charter." Id. For further discussion on the function of preambles in the interpretation of international treaties, see Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266,
282 (Nov. 20).
122. U.N CHARTER preamble (explaining the United Nation's commitment to
establish an international organization committed to human rights, justice, social
programs and better standards of living).
123. Id. The attainment of the United Nation's goals are sought by practicing
tolerance, maintaining international peace and security, and employing international machinery for the promotion of economic and social advancement. See id.
124. See Jost Delbr-ick, Collective Security, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 646, 651 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992); Wolfrum, supra note
121, at 51 (explaining the defining characteristic of collective security to be the
protection of members of a system from attack by other members).
125. See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 283 (1951); Jost
Delbrfick, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A
COMMENTARY 397, 400 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the historical
background, interpretation, and practice of Article 24).
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the primary purpose of the United Nations Charter is to prohibit
uni6
lateral recourse to the use of force as broadly as possible.Y1
The fact that the United Nations adopts the promotion of human
rights among its purposes does not contradict this finding.' 7 Although
there is no general agreement on how to resolve a possible conflict
between the different purposes and principles of the Charter, the order
in which the purposes and principles are set forth indicates a substantive priority.'28 In both the Preamble and Article 1, the prevention of
war and the maintenance of international peace and security are listed
before the promotion of human rights.'29 Thus, the United Nations
Charter expresses a clear hierarchy by declaring peace "as the supreme
value.., more compelling even than human rights." This does not
mean human rights must always be subordinate to the maintenance of
international peace and state sovereignty.' It indicates, however, that
the protection of human rights through military measures are primarily
126. See Krysztof Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States, Collective Security,

Law of War and Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 739, 746
(Max Soerensen ed., 1968) (explaining that the framers of the Charter intended to
remove force as a means of settling international disputes).
127. See TESON, supra note 98, at 3 (explaining that restraint from use of force
and fundamental human rights are central concepts in legal and moral judgments).
128. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Purposesand Principlesof the United Nations,

in 2 UNITED NATIONS:

LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE

994, 996 (Rildiger Wolfrum

& Christiane Philipp eds., 1995).
129. The Preamble states, in relevant part, "[w]e the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights." U.N. CHARTER preamble. Similarly, Article I of the
Charter provides that "[t]he Purposes of the United Nations are to maintain international peace and security, and ...[t]o develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
130. LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS
146 (1990); see Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence
War, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 121 (1991) (explaining that an interpretation of the
Charter that considers any use of force, humanitarian or otherwise, illegal is consistent with the intent of the Charters framers); see also EHRLICH & O'CONNELL,
supra note 87, at 328 (discussing the legal context for asserting a right of forcible
humanitarian intervention).
131. See JESSUP, supra note 95, at 169 (stating that "[t]raditional international
law has recognized the right of a state to employ its armed forces for the protection
of the lives and property of its nationals abroad").
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reserved to collective actions under the authority of the United Nations.
This interpretation is supported by Article 2(3), which obliges
Member States to pursue the peaceful settlement of disputes, and influences the interpretation of Section 4 of this Article.", In addition,
other United Nations Charter provisions that include exceptions from
the prohibition on the use of force, such as Articles 42, 51, and 53, set

up detailed procedural requirements."' From these provisions, one
may conclude that the United Nations Charter permits the use of force
only under narrow, explicitly stated prerequisites."' Thus, the systematic interpretation demonstrates that Article 2(4) entails a comprehensive prohibition on the use of force covering all forms of interstate
armed conflicts regardless of their purpose."35
This conclusion is supported by a teleological interpretation of Article 2(4)."6 The teleological interpretation addresses the meaning of a
treaty provision in light of the purpose pursued by the treaty as a
whole." 7 The primary purpose of the United Nations Charter is to

132. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3 (stating that -[m]embers shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered"); DINSTEIN, supra note H 0, at 85
(noting that the term "war" is not dispensed within the Preamble).
133. See DINSTEIN, supra note 110, at 86 (articulating that, "[n]ot counting the
license to take action against the enemy states of the Second World War (Articles 53
and 107), there are only two enduring settlings in which the Charter permits the use
of inter-state force: collective security (Article 42) and self-defense (Article 511").
134. See id. (describing attempts to limit the scope of the prohibition on the use
of force).
135. See LASSA OPPENHEIM & HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
154 (7th ed. 1952); IAN BROWVNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
BY STATES 267 (1963); Eduardo Jim~nez de Ar~chaga, International Law in the
Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 91 (1978 1).
136. See Ress, supra note 114, at 42.
137. See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 et seq. (May 28) (listing elements of
interpretation of the Genocide Convention to include, "It]he origins and character
of that Convention, the objects pursued by the General Assembly and the contracting parties, [and] the relations which exist between the provisions of the Convention"); Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg.),
1959 I.C.J. 127, 142 (Preliminary Objections of May 26); Certain Expenses of the
United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), 1962 I.C.J. 151, 157 (July
20); see also Ress, supra note 114, at 42 (stating that interpretations relating to the
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comprehensively prohibit the use of force with the explicitly and detailed provisions of the United Nations Charter itself as the only exceptions.'38 Contrary to this goal, a narrow interpretation of Article
2(4) would exclude a substantive portion of intrastate armed conflicts
from the scope of the prohibition.'" In accordance with the interpretive
rule of effet utile or the effectiveness principle, used to interpret international treaties such as the United Nations Charter, 40 when two or
more possible interpretations conflict the one that best serves the recognizable purpose of the treaty prevails.' 4 ' Because a broad understanding of Article 2(4) best serves the United Nations Charter's aim
to prohibit the use of force, the teleological interpretation4 2also supports
a wide reading of this United Nations Charter provision.'
Finally, the legislative history as manifested in the travaux pr6paratoiresindicates the wording of Article 2(4) was not intended to
restrict the scope of this provision but to give specific guarantees to
small states fearful of foreign interventions by powerful countries. 141
purpose of the Charter should be confined to the provisions of the treaty); Skubiszewski, supra note 126, at 893.
138. See Ress, supra note 114, at 42.
139. See DINSTEIN, supra note 110, at 85 (commenting that violation of territorial integrity does not occur where the use of force is confined within a foreign
state's boundaries).
140. See International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 187 (July
11) (de Visscher, J., dissenting) (urging that an interpretation of treaty clauses
should not deprive the treaty of the practical effect of benefiting others); see also
Ress, supra note 114, at 42 (discussing the "Practical-Effects" rule).
141. See InternationalStatus of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 187 (arguing
for systemic-wide efforts at reconciling treaty texts and for the preservation of the
practical effects of each treaty); see also Ress, supra note 114, at 42 (stating that
an interpretation which best serves the purpose of the treaty should be followed);
Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness,
26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 48, 67 (1949).
142. See Bert V.A. RM1ing, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter,
in CASSESE, supra note 105, at 7 (explaining Article 2(4) as a prohibition on war
and a "precondition of life itself in the atomic era").
143. For a more detailed description, see BROWNLIE, supra note 135, at 266. An
indication of the original intent is revealed in discussions of the preparatory committee. The delegate from Brazil, for example, objected to the possibility of a restricted interpretation of the wording of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
In response, the United States delegate made clear that the intention of the authors
of the original text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute, all-inclusive prohibition. See VI UNC.I.O., at 334-35; see also Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in
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Accordingly, an interpretation of Article 2(4) indicates a presumption against unilateral military measures underlying the United Nations Charter as a whole.'" Any military intervention by a foreign state
falls under the scope of Article 2(4), regardless of whether its purpose
is benign or hostile.
Another line of argument against this interpretation of Article 2(4)
emphasizes that the potential contribution of international law to controlling the use of force remains of limited practical significance until
the international politics move toward further democratization as the
only guarantee for a reciprocal observance of international norms."
This argument is reflected in the general position of a number of legal
and international relations scholars.' Unless the system of collective
security envisioned at the signing of the United Nations Charter is effectively enforced, the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) is
altered by the contrary subsequent practice of states, as adopted to
conform to the realities of the international system."s
HistoricalContext, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 271, 276 (1985).
144. See BROWNLIE, supra note 135, at 268.

145. See CASSESE, supra note 105, at 4 (commenting that the qualification that
force must be directed "against the territorial integrity of political independence"
of the injured state stems from Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations).
146. See David P. Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought: The Use of Force in the
Reagan Years, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45, 75 (1994) (noting that the progressive liberal thought believes in the notion that the "use of force in international
politics could be controlled through international law").
147. See Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Law and Reciprociy, 78 AM. SOC. INT'L L. 59, 60
(1984). For an overview of this position, see Fidler, supra note 146, at 75 (arguing
that liberal realism recognizes the potential limitations of international law to control the use of force "unless international political conditions charge significantly
so that reciprocity will be effective when vital national interests are at stake").
148. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Custonari' International Law, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 101, 105 (1987) (commenting that the state practice of interpreting
customary international law or the Charter has drastically altered the meaning of
Article 2(4)); W. Michael Reisman, Criteriafor the Lawful Use of Force in InternationalLaw, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279, 281 (1985); Alberto R. Coil, The Limits of

Global Consciousness and Legal Absohtism: ProtectingInternational Law from
Some of Its Best Friends, 27 HARv. INT'L L.J. 599, 620 (1986); see also JULIUS
STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 96 (1958) (questioning what it means to
be in the position of a wronged state when the determination of "collective interest" fails); A.V. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTiON 209 (1956). The
most extreme position in the legal literature suggests that due to a lack of effective
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These arguments, however, are not sufficient to justify a narrow interpretation of the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). 49 In
addition, no state has invoked another state's breach of Article 2(4) as
a legal justification for abrogating this provision.O Furthermore,

whether the United Nations Charter's rules on the use of force have
changed through contrary subsequent state practice remains question-

able."' Although the practice of states is a generally recognized
method of treaty interpretation, 52' the frequent violations of the prohi-

bition on the use of force throughout the history of the United Nations
did not lead to a reinterpretation or even abrogation of Article 2(4). It
is questionable whether the Charter, in light of its express and detailed

enforcement, Article 2(4) has become a "dead letter." See Thomas M. Franck, Who
Killed Article 2(4)? or: ChangingNorms Governing the Use of Forceby States, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970); see also Eugene Rostow, The Legality of the International Use of Force by and from States, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 286, 287-88 (1985);
Anthony Clark Arend, InternationalLaw and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in
Paradigms,27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 45 (1990) (explaining that states have chosen
to reject the strict norm of Article 2(4)). Instead, states favor a more permissive
interpretation that allows for the use of force in certain circumstances. See Arend,
supra, at 45. States have not reached a consensus on a permissive norm that limits
intervention to situations where it is used for democratic self-determination. See id.
149. As one author observes, the legislative history of this provision does not support the notion that an effective functioning of the collective security system is a prerequisite to renouncing the use of force. See Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 125 (1986) (arguing that
the Charter's drafters realistically and properly preserved the right of self-defense in
response to an armed attack); see also HENKIN, supra note 130, at 138; Randelzhofer, supra note 92, at 128.
150. See Schachter, supra note 149, at 128-29 (discussing various legal theories
supporting the view that new developments in international relations have weakened rules on the use of force).
151. See id. at 130 (stating that some commentators consider consistent violations of Article 2(4) to supercede the Charter rules and corresponding customary
international law).
152. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art.
31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340; see also Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 22 (June 21) (explaining that successfully passed United Nations resolution should be presumed
valid); ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 424 (1961); Ress, su-

pra note 114, at 39 (analyzing subsequent practice as an autonomous element of
interpretation and of constitutive Charter adoption).
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provisions concerning amendments to the treaty, is open to a process
that amounts not to a mere reinterpretation, but a fundamental change
in the meaning of one of its core provisions."
Assuming the United Nations Charter is a flexible, "living constitution"'55 that permits such extreme interpretations,"" it is not clear that
state practice supports the proposition that the scope of Article 2(4)
has changed.' Treaties are never changed through the practice of
states alone. Change requires at least an implicit agreement between
all parties concerning the changed meaning of the treaty provision in
question.' In nearly every case, when a state turned to military means
without a valid justification, a large number of states condemned these

153. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 108, 109.
154. See Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forun: The Reconstruction of Article 2(7) and the Rise of Federalism under the United Nations Charter,31 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 353, 372 (1996) (describing attempts to move beyond the traditional
paradigm as efforts leading to a new law of "constitutional interpretation"). For a
skeptical view on fundamental changes of the United Nations Charter through subsequent practice in general, see Bruno Simma & Stefan Brunner, Article 27. in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY

430, 450 (Bruno Simma et

al. eds., 1994) (offering a skeptical view on fundamental changes of the United
Nations Charter through subsequent practice).
155. Jost Delbrfick, Peacekeeping by United Nations and the Rule of La'i; in
DECLARATIONS ON PRINCIPLE-A QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE 73, 79 (Robert J.
Akkerman et al. eds., 1977); see LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS-COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 23 (3d ed. 1969).

156. For a discussion on modification of the Charter in connection with the requirement of the 'concurring votes' of the permanent members of the Security
Council under United Nations Charter Article 27(3), which in practice also allows
abstentions of the permanent members, see Simma & Brunner, supra note 154, at
447. The validity of the practice was also confirmed by the I.C.J. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art. 31(3){b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at
340; see also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
157. See Ress, supra note 114, at 39 (discussing subsequent practice in a historical subjective perception).
158. See Simma & Brunner, supra note 154, at 450; Wolfram Karl & Bernd
Miitzelburg, Article 108, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A
COMMENTARY 1163, 1167 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (discussing informal
modification of treaties and constitutive instruments of international organizations).
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acts as a violation of international law.' 59 Furthermore, in justifying the
use of force, states have been reluctant to rely on a narrow interpretation of Article 2(4), they have instead based their actions on a broad
understanding of the right of self-defense, thus recognizing the validity
of this Charter provision.'60 If these arguments had merit during Cold
War super-power confrontations, they have now lost much of their
factual basis. 6 ' The end of the Cold War marked a revitalization, indeed the awakening, of the Security Council and the system of collective security. 6 2 This revitalization materialized with the adoption of
sanctions and the authorization to use force against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.163
The military actions of the ECOWAS states, primarily Nigeria, fall
within the scope of the prohibition on the use of force of Article 2(4),
regardless of the purpose pursued. This does not necessarily render the
military action illegal under international law. To justify the use of
armed force by ECOMOG, however, it is necessary to examine the
possible legal basis of ECOWAS's intervention.
159. See JOHN MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL O
VIOLENCE

125 (1982).

160. See Schachter, supra note 108, at 1632. But see David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary
International Law, 39 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 198, 202 (1996) (discussing the
"words versus action" problem in this context).
161. See JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 88, at 423-27 (providing ten Cold War
examples of various countries invoking the right of self-defense); PETER
MALANCZUK, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE USE

OF FORCE 25, 26 (1993) (recognizing the argument against authorizing the use of
force in response to human rights violations confined to the territory of violating
state); Nolte, supra note 74, at 620; TES6N, supra note 98, at 158 n.81 (conceding
the growing weakness of this argument).
162. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibitionon the Use of Force:
The U.N. 's Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 453-54
(1991) (asserting that the end of the Cold War freed the United Nations to enforce
the United Nations Charter prohibition on the use of force). The Security Council
enforced this prohibition against Iraq. See id. at 454.
163. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990) (requesting that member states provide support for political action against Iraq); see also Tono Eitel, The Escape and Parole of the Imprisoned
God of War-An Overview of the Second Gulf War from the Perspective of International Law, 35 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 170, 180 (1992) (noting that the United
Nations Security Council announced that all necessary means would be used to restore peace should Iraq fail to withdraw from Kuwait).
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B. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN SIERRA
LEONE

Although the military intervention of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone
falls within the scope of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, the
action nevertheless may be justifiable under accepted norms of international law permitting the use of armed force by states. ECOWAS
presented a number of reasons to justify the intervention. The most
prominent justifications include: the right to self-defense," the appeal
by President Kabbah seeking ECOWAS assistance,"5 the atrocities
committed by junta troops against Sierra Leonean citizens," the threat
to international peace and security in the region caused by the flow of

164. See Ibrahim Gambari, Press Conference by Nigeria. Mar. 19, 1998 (visited
Sept. 19, 1998) < http://www.un.org/> ("ECOMOG had eventually used force, as a
last resort and only in self-defense"); James Jonah, Press Conference by Permanent Representatives of Sierra Leone, Feb. 18. 1998 (visited Sept. 19, 1998)
<http:I/wwwv.un.org/> [hereinafter Jonah, Feb. 18 Press Cofli'rence] (asserting that
Article 51 of the ECOWAS Charter provides for self-defense and the principle of
collective security); James Jonah, Press Conference by Permanent Representative
of Sierra Leone, June 9, 1997 (visited Sept. 19. 1998) <http://www.un.org/>
[hereinafter Jonah, June 9 Press Conference] (arguing that ECOWAS did not require a United Nations Security Resolution to intervene in Sierra Leone because
the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter authorized
the military action); James Jonah, Press Conference by Permanent Representative
of Sierra Leone, May 27, 1997 (visited Sept. 19, 1998) < http:/iwww.un.org/>
[hereinafter Jonah, May 27 Press Conference] (maintaining that a sovereign state
may seek assistance of any legitimate government under United Nations Charter
self-defense principles).
165. See Jonah, May 27 Press Conference, supra note 164 (reporting that President Kabbah appealed to ECOWAS for immediate assistance to restore civilian
rule to Sierra Leone); Jonah, Feb. 18 Press Co!lerence, supra note 164 (stating
President Kabbah's sentiments that the ECOMOG would probably remain in Sierra
Leone for a considerable period of time).
166. See Final Conlnluniqu of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of
ECOWAS in Conak7y, Guinea, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1997/499
(declaring that the ECOWAS Minister for Foreign Affairs deplored the bloodshed
and other human losses which followed the coup d'Jtat in Sierra Leone); James
Jonah, Press Conference by Sierra Leone, Sept. 11, 1997 (visited Sept. 19, 1998)
<http.www.un.org> [hereinafter Jonah, Sept. 11 Press Conference] (describing the
manner in which the military junta carried out atrocities against the Sierra Leonean
populace). For example, the junta killed seven students demonstrating against the
military regime. See id. In addition, junta plans included civilian detention, landmines, poison gas, and use of human shields. See id.
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Sierra Leonean refugees to neighboring countries, 67 and the prevention of the execution of a "genocide plan" by the junta." 8
Some of the justifications for use of armed forces, which lack basis
in international law, can be dealt with briefly.' 69 A general interest in
the political stability and security of the region is understandable from
a political point of view, but cannot provide a basis under international
law for a military intervention.' The recent practice of the Security
Council in connection with Iraq,17' Haiti, 72 Rwanda,' 73 Burundi,' 74 and

167. See Final Communiqu of the ECOWAS Summit in Abuja, U.N. SCOR, 52d
Sess., Annex II, at 19, U.N. Doc. S/1997/695/Annex 11 (1997) [hereinafter Abtja
Final Communique] (reaffirming the ECOWAS Member States' collective commitment to restore constitutional order to Sierra Leone). This commitment is required because of the potential influx by Sierra Leonean refugees in neighboring
states, which, in turn, threatens international peace and security in the region. See
id.
168. See Jonah, June 9 Press Conference, supra note 164 (describing how the
military junta targeted supporters of the Kabbah government); Jonah, Sept. 11
Press Conference, supra note 166 (affirming that the military junta planned to direct the genocide plan against Sierra Leoneans).
169. For example, intervention based on humanitarian concerns, particularly for
the "restoration of democracy," is not accepted in international law given the explicit provisions of the United Nations Charter. See SHAW, supra note 88, at 803;
see also Anthony Chukwukaa Ofodile, The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in
Liberia, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 413 (1994) (arguing that ECOWAS
acted illegally because such actions ventured beyond general peacekeeping and
attempted to influence the outcome of the civil war in Liberia).
170. See Nolte, supra note 74, at 619 (emphasizing that although "security interests" may be invoked to justify military intervention from a political standpoint,
such interests are too general and imprecise to provide justification under international law).
171. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/688 (1991) (expressing concern for the repression of Iraqi civilians, which
led to a massive flow of refugees from Kurdish populated areas).
172. See S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/841 (1993) (expressing concern that the Haitian humanitarian crisis, manifesting through a climate of persecution and economic dislocation, could increase
the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighboring nations); see also S.C. Res.
875, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3293d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/875 (1993) (reaffirming the commitment expressed in Resolution 841 supporting the leadership of
the United Nations and the Organization of American States, as well as the international community, to reach a political solution to the Haitian crisis).
173. See S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/918 (1994) (exhibiting concern about the death of innocent civilians, sig-
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Zaire175 seems to suggest that massive flows of refugees across borders
constitute a threat to international peace and security capable of activating the enforcement powers of the Security Council under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter.' 6 Such a situation in itself, however, does not justify unilateral use of force by the affected states.'"
Furthermore, President Kabbah's accusations that the junta was executing a "genocide plan" in Sierra Leone, or at least planned to in case
of a foreign
intervention, are not substantiated by any objective
78
proof.
Other possible justifications, however, deserve a more careful
analysis. In the following sections, possible justifications for the mili-

nificant internal displacement of the Rwandan population, and massive exodus of
Rwandan refugees to neighboring countries). The United Nations Security Council
also stressed the need for coordinated international action to alleviate the suffering
of the Rwandan people. See id. at 2; see also S.C. Res. 1161, U.N. SCOR, 53d
Sess., 3870th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 161 (1998) (re-emphasizing the need
for a solution to the refugee problem in the Great Lakes region of sub-Saharan Africa).
174. See S.C. Res. 1040, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3623d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/1040 (1996) (lamenting the deteriorating situation in Burundi and its potential to destabilize the neighboring region). The Security Council stressed the
need for the continuation and intensification of efforts by the international community to avert further deterioration of the situation in Burundi. See id.
175. See S.C. Res. 1078, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3710th mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/1078 (1996) (expressing grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian
situation in Eastern Zaire and supporting refugees voluntary repatriation to secure
regional security); see also S.C. Res. 1097, 52d Sess., 3741st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1097 (1997) (endorsing a five-point peace plan for Eastern Zaire, including
protection and security for all refugees and displaced persons).
176. See, e.g., Lois E. Fielding, Taking a Closer Look at Threats to Peace: The
Power of the Security Council to Address Humanitarian Crises, 73 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 551, 566 (1996) (noting that Security Council Resolution 688 indicates that refugee flow can constitute a threat to peace and security).
177. Comipare Nolte, supra note 74, at 619 (arguing that nations may not resort
to the use of force, for general security reasons, despite the United Nations enforcement provision in Chapter VII), ivith Brian K. McCalmon, States, Refugees,
and Self-Defense, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 215, 238 (1996) (arguing that a state has a
right to use force to defend itself against massive influxes of refugees).
178. See Jonah, June 9 Press Conference, supra note 164 (stating that, although
the permanent representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations claimed evidence of a junta-planned genocide, the Secretary-General indicated no such
planned undertaking).
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tary intervention will be evaluated to determine whether there is a legal basis for the use of armed force in Sierra Leone.
1. Legitimization by the Security Council as a Justificationfor the
Intervention
In searching for a justification for ECOMOG's use of force in Sierra Leone, the initial inquiry is whether the Security Council of the
United Nations authorized the intervention.' 79 Pursuant to the powers
of the Security Council under Chapters VII and VIII of the United
Nations Charter, such an authorization would turn the ECOWAS intervention into a legalized "enforcement action," thus constituting a
permissible exception to the prohibition of the use of force of Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter."'8
a. Resolution 1132-Security Council Authorization to Restore
Democracy by Force?
The situation in Sierra Leone may qualify as an exception to the Security Council's prohibition on the use of force.'8 ' In contrast to
ECOWAS intervention in Liberia seven years earlier,'82 the Security
Council reacted in a number of ways to the coup d'6tat in Sierra Leone.'83 After the President of the Security Council repeatedly con179. See Ulrich Beyerlin, Regional Arrangements, in 2 UNITED NATIONS LAW,

(Ruediger Wolfrum & Christiane Philipp, eds.
1995) (suggesting that there is no clear distinction between regional enforcement,
which may or may not require prior authorization).
POLICIES AND PRACTICE 1040, 1042

180. See Randelzhofer, supra note 92, at 119.
181. See generally Jochen A. Frowein, Article 39, in THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER-A COMMENTARY 612 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (highlighting
the mandate that the Security Council find, at a minimum, a threat to international

peace and security before adopting economic and military sanctions).
182. See Binaifer Nowrojee, Joining Forces: United Nations and Regional
Peacekeeping-Lessonsfrom Liberia, 32 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 129, 134 (1995)

(stating that ECOWAS unexpectedly intervened in an attempt to prevent an impending bloodbath in the Liberian capital of Monrovia); Ofodile, supra note 168,
at 382 (commenting on ECOWAS's active role in the Liberian conflict).
ECOWAS not only demanded that all parties refrain from hostilities, but also declared it would enforce a cease-fire without the parties consent. See id. See Nolte,
supra note 74, at 618 (describing the official justification for ECOWAS's Liberian
intervention).
183. See Statement by the Presidentof the Security Councilfrom May 27, 1997,
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demned the overthrow of the democratically elected government of
Sierra Leone and called for an immediate restoration of President
Kabbah,'" the Security Council adopted Resolution 1132 on October
8, 1997. 85' The Resolution determined that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter," thus opening the door for the
adoption of mandatory economic and military sanctions. ' The resolution also expressed the Security Council's grave concerns about the
"continued violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone following the
military coup of 25 May 1997, the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in that country, and the consequences for neighboring countries."'' 8 Nearly all state representatives, however, made clear in their
statements prior to the adoption of the resolution that the reason for
adopting the sanctions was to condemn the military coup.'" These
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1997/29, at 1 (stressing the need to implement the Abdijan
Agreement as a viable framework for peace in Sierra Leone).
184. See id. (calling for an immediate restoration of Sierra Leone's democratically elected government); Statement by the President ofthe Security Council from
July 11, 1997, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1997/36, at 1 (declaring the attempt to overthrow President Kabbah to be unacceptable); Statement by the Presidentof the Security Council from Aug. 6, 1997, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1997/42 (calling on the
military junta that overthrew President Kabbah to immediately and unconditionally
restore the Kabbah regime).
185. See S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, at 2 (demanding that the military junta
relinquish power in Sierra Leone).
186. See id. (declaring that the military junta takeover satisfies the official
threshold as a threat to international peace and security).
187. At a minimum, the Security Council must find a threat to international
peace and security in accordance with Article 39 of the United Nations Charter as a
prerequisite for the adoption of economic as well as military sanctions under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. See Frowein, supra note 181, at 61213. The fact that the Security Council does not expressly mention Article 39 in
adopting Resolution 1132 has no further legal implications. It is sufficient if the
Security Council implicitly refers to this provision by stating the existence of a
threat to the peace. See Helmut FreudenschuB, Article 39 of the U.N. CharterRevisited: Threats to the Peace and the Recent Practice of the U.N. Securi., Council,
46 AUS. J.PUB. & INT'L L. 1, 31 (1993); Ruth Lapidoth, Some Reflections on the
Law and Practice Concerningthe Imposition of Sanctions by the Security Council,
30 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 114, 115 (1992) (supporting the idea that it is possible for the Security Council to proceed directly to a resolution without prior determination of a threat or breach of peace).
188. S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, at 2.
189. See generally U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3822d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIPV.3822
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statements demonstrate the Resolution sought to reinstate Sierra Leone's elected government. 9 o
A military coup is generally not the kind of "aggressive use of force
across a boundary" traditionally understood to constitute a threat to
international peace;' 9' however, the violent overthrow of a democratically elected government as a threat to international peace and security
under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter is not without precedence.' 92 In 1994, the Security Council determined that the overthrow
of the democratically elected government of President Aristide in Haiti
constituted a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore,
(1997) (memorializing the Security Council members' statements). For example,
the representative of France stated that sanctions would promote a peaceful resolution of the Sierra Leonean crisis. See id. at 6. In addition, the representative of
Kenya maintained that the imposition of sanctions would reaffirm the international
commitment to democracy. See id. at 5. The representative of China, however, expressed concern for the effect sanctions might have for the people of Sierra Leone.
See id. at 14.
190. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3822, supra note 189 (demonstrating the strong,
widespread support for the resolution to reinstate the elected government of Sierra
Leone). The representative of the United States, for instance, stated "The international community cannot afford to acquiesce in the arbitrary and unconstitutional
overthrow of a democratic government." Id. at 7. The United States representative
added that, "(t)he United States strongly supports this draft resolution, which
makes clear that the illegal military regime in Sierra Leone must step down." Id. at
16. Similarly, the Russian Federation representative stated, "(t)he Russian Federation, given that its unacceptable to forcibly overthrow democratically elected Governments, decisively condemned the perpetrators of the coup .
k..."
Id. at 9. The
Chilean representative declared: "We hope that the members of the illegitimate
junta realize that the international community is not prepared to accept coups." Id.
at 18.
191. See Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order
Precedentfor the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 341, 342 n.3 (1995) (noting
that the United Nations Security Council limits "enforcement measures" to situations involving a threat to international peace and security, specifically, an "aggressive use of force across a boundary"); see also David Wippman, Defelnding
Democracy Through Foreign Intervention, 19 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 659, 672 (1997)
(declaring that recent interventions authorized by the Security Council did not entail the kind of "aggressive use of force across a boundary" traditionally understood to constitute a threat to international peace). Significantly, the Security
Council authorized military intervention to curb famine in Somalia and to end the
repression of Kurds in Iraq. See id.
192. See S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/770 (1992) (authorizing states to take all measures necessary to facilitate
the delivery of humanitarian assistance due to the war in Bosnia).
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the Security Council authorized enforcement measures to remove the
military 1leaders
from power under Chapter VII of the United Nations
93
Charter.
While the Security Council remained cautious in the Haitian situation by stressing the unique circumstances that led to the adoption of
the resolution, Resolution 1132 fails to note any such special circumstances.'94 Furthermore, while the Haitian resolution may have been
adopted because of the political interests of the United States in reducing the flow of refugees to its country, the situation in Sierra Leone
did not directly effect the national interest of one of the permanent
members of the Security Council.'" Thus, Resolution 1132 may be regarded as a further step by the Security Council towards extending its
powers under Chapter VII to a certain variety of crisis within a state. '
The collapse of a government followed by civil war, massive statesponsored violations of fundamental human rights, and the violent
overthrow of a democratically elected government may no longer be
regarded as matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a
state. 197 Recent United Nations practice suggests that these situations
are now issues of international concern.9'

193. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/940 (1994) (authorizing the United Nations member states to form a multinational force and use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of military
leadership and restore legitimate authority).
194. See id. (recognizing that the unique character of the situation in Haiti and
its complex and extraordinary nature requires "an exceptional response").
195. See S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, para. 15 (expressing concern with the
military coup's consequences on Sierra Leone's neighboring countries).
196. See MALANCZUK, supra note 161, at 24 (asserting that the special circumstances prompting United Nations Security Council 794 to authorize humanitarian
intervention in Somalia). The combination of chaotic and endless civil war, mass
starvation, and threats to humanitarian assistance prompted the United Nations to
intervention. See id.
197. See id. (determining that the magnitude of human tragedy caused by the
internal Somalian conflict constituted a "threat to international peace and security").
198. See id. (declaring that, given the Somalian situation, a Security Council
Resolution stated that internal aspects of a humanitarian problem may require
military enforcement measures).
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The Security Council apparently enjoys wide discretion-although
in light of the relevant Charter provisions not unlimited' 9 --in determining a threat to international peace under Article 39 of the United
Nations Charter. This discretion correlates with the notion of peace in
the Charter that is not merely restricted to the absence of interstate
military conflicts, but is positively defined as a process of growing
justice, democratization, and respect for human rights.2 o
199. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in InternationalLaw, 250 RECUEIL DES COuRs 217, 269-70 (1994 VI) (arguing that Article 39 provides the Security Council with a wide margin of appreciation, with respect to both the assessment of factual situations and the legal significance of the
events); Jochen A. Frowein, Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches
of Public InternationalLaw, 248 RECUEIL DES COURS 345, 382 (1994 IV) (questioning the extent to which a Security Council recommendation under Article 39
creates a presumption for the lawfulness of the behavior recommended to the
member states of the United Nations).
200. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 143, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046
(1992) ("The absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in itself
ensure international peace and security . . . . [N]on-military sources of instability
[include] the economic, social, humanitarian, and ecological fields"); see also Jost
Delbriick, A Fresh Look at HumanitarianIntervention Under the Authority of the
United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 898 (1992) (asserting that the Security Council
may authorize forcible intervention aimed at ending or preventing actions by individual states other that acts of aggression or threats or breaches to peace so long as
the actions are a threat to international peace and security); David P. Fidler,
Caught between Traditions: The Security Council in PhilosophicalConundrum, 17
MICH. J. INT'L L. 411, 431-32 (1996) ("The Security Council's backing of the use
of military force to restore Haitian democracy illustrates the Security Council's
potential to include democracy as an element of maintaining international peace
and security"); Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or
against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS 195, 341 (1993 IV) (stating that international peace requires the lack of uncontrolled inter-state violence and minimally orderly in-state conditions). Tomuschat adds that the "(e)njoyment of basic
human rights pertains to those core elements of a situation which truly deserve a
characterization as peace." Id. But see Falk, supra note 191, at 356 (questioning
the United Nations; authorization of the use of force in Haiti where the only threat
to international peace and security resulted from the outflow of refugees); Ruth E.
Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519, 559 (1994) (supporting United Nations' Secretary
General Dag Hammarskjold's warning against employing United Nations elements
in internally-based situations); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Regulating the Use of Force
in the 21st Century: The ContinuingImportance of State Autonomy, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 473, 487 (1997) (discussing the Security Council's rejection of an
expansive interpretation of the United Nations Charter where the interests of a single state is involved, even in cases of massive human rights abuses); Oscar
Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implicationsfor International
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In Resolution 1132, the Security Council again demanded that the
military junta relinquish power to the democratically elected government and adopted a variety of sanctions against Sierra Leone pursuant
to its powers under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. The
Council requested, with binding force, that all states prevent members
of the military junta and adult members of their families from entering
into or traversing through their territory.2" The Council also requested
states to adopt a petroleum and arms embargo against Sierra Leone,
subject to exceptions on a case-by-case basis for humanitarian purposes approved by a Committee of the Security Council.: 2
The Security Council invoked Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter to authorize ECOWAS, in cooperation with the legitimate
government of Sierra Leone, "to ensure strict implementation of the
provisions of this resolution relating to the supply of petroleum...
and arms ... including, where necessary and in conformity with applicable international standards, by halting inward maritime shipping in
order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations... .":' Thus,
the Security Council employed its powers to authorize regional arrangements and agencies to enforce economic sanctions pursuant to its
authority under Article 53(1), Clause 1 of the United Nations Charter.2'
In the absence of a definition in the Charter itself, some dispute
exists about the elements that constitute regional arrangements in accordance with Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. 5 Generally,

Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 20 (1997) (noting that many governments
expressed reservations about the Security Council's demand to oust the military
regime in Haiti).
201. See S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, at 2 (deciding that states shall prevent
such persons from moving through their territories except as authorized by
ECOWAS for verified humanitarian purposes or as part of the process of relinquishing power).
202. See id. (prohibiting states from selling or supplying Sierra Leone with petroleum, arms, ammunition, and military equipment).
203. Id. at 3.

204. See Georg Ress, Article 53, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A
COMMENTARY 722, 730 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) ("The [Security Council]
may initiate its own enforcement measures and utilize the regional arrangements or
agencies to carry them out").
205. See David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECO WAS and the Liberian
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regional arrangements may be defined as a union of states closely
linked in territorial terms or an international organization based upon
a collective treaty, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace
and security within the framework of the United Nations.0 6 Originally, ECOWAS was designed to function as an economic union.0 7
Eventually, however, ECOWAS became a regional system of collective security through the Protocol of Non-Aggression of April 22,
1978, particularly the Protocol Relating to the Mutual Assistance on
Defense of May 29, 1981 208 Accordingly, ECOWAS maybe regarded
as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter. 20 9 This view is consistent with the fact that the Security

Council, under an apparently broad understanding of Article 52 re-

Civil War, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT-COLLECTIVE INTERVENTIONS IN INTERNAL
157, 183 (Lori Fisler Damroseh ed., 1993) (identifying the lack of consensus as to the definition of a Chapter VIII regional organization).
206. See Waldemar Hummer & Michael Schweitzer, Article 52, in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY 679, 699 (Bruno Simma et
al. eds., 1994) (defining regional arrangement or agency as a union of states or an
international organization based on a collective treaty or a constitution with the
primary task of maintaining peace and security); see also Joachim Wolf, Regional
Arrangements and the U.N. Charter, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984) (characterizing regional
arrangements as comprising all those arrangements whereby states of a particular
region regulate political, economic, or other relations).
207. See Edward Kannyo, Civil Strife and HumanitarianIntervention in Africa:
A Preliminaty Assessment, 4 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 51, 60 (1996) (stating that
ECOWAS was established primarily to coordinate the economic development of
the African region West of Cameroon and Chad, and South of Algeria and Morocco); see also Ofodile, supra note 168, at 410-11 (noting that ECOWAS was
initially an economic union).
208. See Ofodile, supra note 168, at 411 (commenting on the 1978 modification
of the ECOWAS Charter by ECOWAS heads of state so as to adopt the Protocol
on Non-Aggression, thereby committing members to the duty of non-intervention).
The 1981 Protocol provided for mutual assistance and defense in cases of, inter
alia, external aggression and internal armed conflict engineered and actively supported externally so as to endanger regional security and peace. See id.
209. See Hummer & Schweitzer, supra note 206, at 708 (claiming that Articles
16 through 18 of the Protocol Relating to the Mutual Assistance on Defense contains all of the rules necessary to make ECOWAS both a defensive alliance and a
regional system of collective security under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter). But see Wippman, supra note 205, at 183 (questioning whether subregional organizations such as ECOWAS qualify as a Chapter VII regional organization).
CONFLICTS
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gional arrangements,'

0

359

acknowledged ECOWAS by citing Chapter

VIII of the United Nations Charter in context of the Liberian civil
211

war.

In previous cases, the Security Council authorized individual states
or regional organizations to ensure the observance of economic sanctions by halting inward maritime shipping."2 These resolutions either
explicitly legitimized the use of military force, or might at least be interpreted as permitting military measures to ensure the implementation
of the embargo." In 1966, for example, the Security Council authorized the United Kingdom to ensure "by use of force if necessary" the
enforcement of an economic embargo imposed upon Rhodesia.2" Although the Security Council rarely acted with such decisiveness during
the Cold War, authorization to ensure the observance of economic
sanctions became frequent in the 1990s.2'" Resolution 665 of 1990, for
210. See Beyerlin, supra note 179, at 1047 (stating that the United Nations Security Council retroactively "authorized" ECOWAS's intervention in Liberia).
211. See S.C. Res. 913, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3187th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/813 (1993) (welcoming ECOWAS's continued commitment to reaching a
peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict); see also S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 1277th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/788 (1992) (seeking ECOWAS's
continued commitment towards achieving peace in Liberia).
212. See S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1277th mtg. at I, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/221 (1966) (calling upon the United Kingdom to prevent vessels reasonably
believed to be carrying oil from reaching Rhodesia); see also Beyerlin supra note
210, at 108 (stating that the Security Council, for the first time under Chapters VII
and VIII of the United Nations Charter, called upon states acting nationally or
through regional agencies, to use such measures as necessary to halt maritime
shipping to and from the former Yugoslavia).
213. See id. (allowing the United Kingdom to use necessary force to intercept
Rhodesia-bound vessels).
214. See S.C. Res. 221, supra note 212, at 1 (authorizing the use of force against
vessels carrying oil to Rhodesia); see also Frowein, supra note 199, at 377-78 (describing how the Security Council empowered the United Kingdom to arrest and
detain the Joanna VI tanker); see generally Tomuschat, supra note 200, at 337 (arguing that the denial of rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia prompted measures such as the oil embargo).
215. See Kelly-Kate Pease & David P. Forsythe, HumanitarianIntervention and
InternationalLaw, 35 AUS. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 1, 11-14 (1993) (contrasting the
pre- and post-Cold War Security Council usage of Article 39 authorization to use
force for threats or breaches of peace). The Cold War and other divisions among
the permanent members of the Security Council made it politically impossible to
utilize this authority, with the exception of South Africa's apartheid issues. See id.
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instance, authorized Member States to use all necessary measures to
hold all inward shipping to or from Iraq, with
the Resolution often inr~, 211
terpreted as authorization for the use of force. Similarly, the Security
Council called upon Member States and regional organizations, such
as NATO and the West European Union ("WEU"), to enforce an embargo against the former Yugoslavia during Operation Sharp Guard, 1 "
and to ensure compliance with a ban on flights in the Bosnian and
Herzegovinian airspace under Operation Deny Flight."1 '
The Security Council authorization of ECOWAS to ensure the strict
implementation of the economic embargo by halting inward maritime
shipping may also be interpreted as authorizing the use of military
force to stop ships where necessary to ensure the observance of the
embargo. t 9 In contrast to Resolution 940 passed in 1994 concerning
at 11-12. By the 1990s, however, the Security Council imposed mandatory economic embargoes, for example in Rhodesia, in light of humanitarian violations.
See id. at 13-14. See Howard French, U.N. Approves Ban on Shipments of Oil to
Haiti Military, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1993, at Al (reporting that the United Nations
Security Council voted to impose a worldwide ban on oil shipments to Haiti while
stopping short of authorizing a naval blockade).
216. See S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/665 (1990) (calling upon Member States to halt all Iraq shipping in order to
inspect and verify cargoes and destinations); see also Jochen A. Frowein, Article
42, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONs-A COMMENTARY 628, 634 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 1994) (mandating that Member States deploy maritime forces to
use measures commensurate with specific circumstances as may be necessary to
prevent maritime shipping from entering or leaving Iraq).
217. See S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/787 (1992) (prohibiting shipment of products such as crude oil, coal, iron,
steel, and vehicles through Yugoslavia).
218. See S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3191st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/816 (1993) (deploring the failure of parties to cooperate with United Nations airfield monitors); see also Antonia Handler Chayes & Richard Weitz, The
Military Perspective on Conflict Prevention: NATO, in PREVENTING CONFLICT IN
THE POST-COMMUNIST WORLD-MOBILIZING INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS 381, 392 (Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes eds., 1996)
(stating that NATO aircraft initially monitored and later enforced the "no-fly zone"
established by Resolution 816); Beyerlin, supra note 210, at 1048-49 (noting the
Security Council authorization to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance
with the ban on flights established pursuant to Resolution 795).
219. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT-COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

274, 301 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993) (arguing that collective forcible measures may be justifiable when collective non-forcible sanctions impair the ability of
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Haiti, however, Resolution 1132 does not generally authorize
ECOWAS to take military measures to remove the junta in Sierra Leone.20 The legitimization of the use of force in the Resolution is expressly limited to ensuring the strict implementation of the economic
embargo.2' Although the Security Council's request that "all those
concerned, including ECOWAS,"-" ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance may also be interpreted as a limited mandate to
use military protection measures, such a request does not provide a legal basis for an intervention aimed at restoring democracy. "' The Security Council's Resolution takes note of the communiqu6 issued at
the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of ECOWAS on Sierra Leone
from June 26, 1997. "- In the communiqu&, the ministers called for the
reinstatement of the legitimate government of Sierra Leone by use of
force ,2 however, this does not signify implicit authorization of
ECOWAS military intervention in Sierra Leone.2-" A reference in the
preamble of a Resolution does not imply an authorization of military
intervention, particularly if contradicted by the text of the Resolution2'"
and the explicit statements of Member States of the Security Couna territory or population to defend itself against forcible attacks).
220. See S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, at 3 (authorizing ECOWAS to halt
maritime shipping to search for petroleum, petroleum products, arms and related
materials).
221. See id. (instructing ECOWAS to ensure strict implementation of the embargo and halt maritime shipping in conformity with international standards).
222. Id. at 4.
223. See Stephan Hobe, New Perspectives for InternationalLaw Enforcement,
"The Future of InternationalLaw Enforcement." New Scenarios-New Law?, 45
Aus. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 53, 61 (1993) (raising the question of limiting the Security
Council's authority to act given the increasing scope of its mandate).
224. See S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, at 1 (referring to the communiqu6 issued
at the meeting of foreign ministers of ECOWAS on Sierra Leone).
225. See Letter Dated 27 June 1997from the PermanentRepresentative oJfNigeria to the United Nations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, 52d Sess., Annex, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1997/499 (1997) (stressing that countries should work towards restoring the legitimate government of Sierra Leone
through a combination of dialogue, imposition of sanctions and embargoes, and the
use of force).
226. See S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, para. 8 (limiting ECOWAS enforcement
capacities to enforcement of the maritime embargo).
227. See id. para. 4 (supporting ECOWAS efforts toward reaching a peaceful
resolution).
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cil. 228 Consequently, Resolution 1132 does not provide a legal basis for

the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone in February 1998, leaving
of 1997 to overthrow the
aside ECOMOG attempts in June and July
229
military junta following the coup d'tat.
b. The Relevance of the Presidential Statement of
February 26, 1998
Although the Security Council did not initially authorize the military actions undertaken by ECOWAS, a possible ex post justification
for the intervention may be found in the later statement made by the
President of the Security Council on February 26, 1998.30 In this
statement, the Council "welcomes' 231the fact that the rule of the military
junta has been brought to an end.
Statements by the President of the Security Council are far from
being legally insignificant.23 2 By expressing consensus among the
Member States, presidential statements can have the same legal effect
as a formal resolution. 233 The question remains, however, whether
228. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3822, supra note 189, at 6 (documenting
France's encouragement of a peaceful resolution in Sierra Leone). The French representative stated that "[tlhe draft expresses the support of the United Nations for
the efforts of the members of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) to bring about, through negotiations, the peaceful restoration of constitutional order and the return of the democratically elected Government." Id.
(emphasis added). The Swedish representative also encouraged a peaceful resolution stating that, "[b]y voting in favor of this draft resolution, Sweden wants to
contribute to a solution by peaceful means, without the use of armed violence ...
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
229. See Beyerlin, supra note 210, at 1042 (questioning regional organization
acts without prior authorization for the Security Council).
230. See Statement by the President of the Security Council, supra note 58, at 2
(commending ECOMOG for liberating hostages held by former members of the
deposed junta).
231. Id. at 1.
232.

See RENATA SONNENFELD, RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 57

(1988) (discussing the importance of presidential statements during the Middle
East conflict in 1973).
233. See S.D. BAILEY, VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 83 (1971) (remark-

ing on the importance of the United Nations President in increasing the number of
United Nations observers in the Suez Canal area in 1967); see also SONNENFELD,
supra note 232, at 57-58 (equating the substance and significance of a presidential
statement to a formal United Nations Resolution).
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military measures by regional organizations like ECOWAS require
prior authorization under Article 53(1) of the United Nations Charter;
or whether this provision allows for later "approvals," which justify
military interventions ex postfacto.2
Some authors argue that the Security Council is not required to
authorize Article 53 enforcement actions before such actions are actually carried out."5 Rather, an authorization by the Security Council at
any stage should be regarded as an implicit authorization of the prior
actions undertaken by the regional organization. Such a broad understanding of "authorization" under Article 53, however, is incompatible with the requirement that the Security Council exercise effective control over regional enforcement actions.!" As control
necessarily includes power to prevent enforcement actions, the Security Council will only maintain effective control through prior authori-

zations.2 1' Any other interpretation of Article 53 results in legal uncertainty at the time of the action.2' 9 The use of ex"postfacto authorization
may also encourage regional arrangements to initiate military actions

234. See Beyerlin, supra note 210, at 1042 (discussing the measures regional
organizations may undertake under Article 52(1)). In this regard, the possibilities
for a regional organization depend on the interpretation of "enforcement action."
Id.
235. See Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 515, 520 (1963) ("It should not be assumed that authorization of the Security Council automatically and necessarily means priorauthorization.").
236. Unless the Security Council states otherwise, authorization implicitly
authorizes earlier stages of the regional action. See Ress, supra note 204, at 724
(citing John N. Moore, The Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of
World Order, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 122, 159
(Richard Falk et al. eds., 1971)); see generally Nolte, supra note 74, at 623 (explaining the importance of presidential statements).
237. See Ress, supra note 204, at 724 (maintaining that the Security Council exercises effective control only with clear, prior authorizations).
238. See id. at 734 (averring that implicitly authorizing prior regional actions
contravenes the general principle that legislation should not be interpreted to permit retroactive decisions to the detriment of another party); see also Oscar
Schachter, InternationalLaw in Theor' and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 8,
159 (1982 V) (contending that a regional organization does not have a right to use
armed force coercively against another state without the Security Council's prior
authorization).
239. See Schachter, supra note 238, at 159 (asserting that authorization of the
prior acts of regional organizations would encourage illegal acts).
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with the expectation or hope that the Security Council would give its

authorization afterwards.

°

Even if such a broad interpretation of Article 53 is considered legal,
Security Council authorization to use force can only be assumed if
such an intention can be derived from the circumstances and the
wording of the statement.2 4' The Presidential Statement of February
26, 1998, although welcoming the fact "that the rule of the military

junta has been brought to an end," also expressed that the Security
Council "remains gravely concerned at the continued violence in the

country and calls for an urgent end to the fighting.

' 42

Furthermore, the

Council commended the important role of ECOWAS "towards the
peaceful resolution of the crisis, 24 ' and encouraged ECOMOG "to
proceed in its efforts... in accordancewith relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations."2 4 The careful wording of the state-

ment indicates the Security Council did not wish to give the impression that it welcomes the use of armed force by ECOMOG in ousting
the military junta from power. 24' From the wording of the statement, it

240. See Michael Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with
Special Reference to the Organization of American States, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
175, 214 (1967) (claiming that the Security Council might find it politically awkward to withhold information for what has already been carried out); Ress, supra
note 204, at 734 (asserting that such an interpretation of Article 53 would create
situations where regional organizations would engage in an act with the intent of
seeking approval after such act has been carried out).
241. See Nolte, supra note 74, at 632 (noting the limitation on the Security
Council's authorization to use force); see also Rosalyn Higgins, The Advisory
Opinion on Namibia: Which U.N. Resolutions are Binding Under Article 25 of the
Charter?, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 270, 281-82 (1972) (claiming that the binding
or non-binding nature of United Nations Resolutions depends on whether the parties intended the Resolutions as "decisions" or "recommendations").
242. Statement by the Presidentof the Security Council, supra note 58, at 1.
243. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
245. For the analysis of a similar statement made by the President of the Security Council following ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990, see Nolte, supra
note 74, at 632. See also Ofodile, supra note 168, at 414 ("The carefully chosen
words indicate that the Security Council was taking a neutral stand by not explicitly approving or condemning ECOWAS action.").
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is difficult to argue that the Security Council intended to authorize
ECOWAS's action expostfacto.' *
Resolution 1156 of March 16, 1998, in which the Council terminated the petroleum embargo, supports the conclusion that the Security Council never extended expost authorization to ECOWAS actions
in Sierra Leone. 47 The Council welcomed "the return to Sierra Leone
of its democratically elected President," but did not mention the role
of ECOWAS in restoring the president. Thus, a prospective authorization by the Security Council cannot provide a legal basis for
ECOWAS military intervention in Sierra Leone. : "
2. Did the ECOMOG Troops Act in Self-Defense?
Nigeria justified ECOMOG's use of armed force in its final major
military attack, which ultimately led to the overthrow of the junta regime within a week of the attack, primarily on the right to selfdefense.20 Although the right of self-defense is generally recognized

246. See Statement by the President of the Security Council,supra note 58, at I2 (encouraging ECOMOG to seek peace and stability and specifically condemning
reprisal killings and related violence).
247. See S.C. Res. 1156, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3681st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/I156 (1998). (deciding to review other prohibitions referenced in Resolution 1132).
248. Id..
249. See id. (maintaining the right to make authorizations with respect to continuing developments in Sierra Leone at a later date).
250. See Gambari, supra note 164 ("ECOMOG had eventually used force, as a
last resort and only in self-defense"); Jonah, Feb. 18 Press Conference, supra note
164 (invoking United Nations Charter Article 51 as justification for foreign military intervention to restore democracy in Sierra Leone). It is unclear, however,
whether Jonah based this assessment on an alleged support of the military junta by
Liberia. See id. Jonah may also regard the military junta's forceful government
takeover as an armed attack within contemplation of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. See id.; SHAW, supra note 88, at 794 (stating that organizations such
as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, specifically based on the Article 51 right of collective self-defense, considers an attack upon one party as an attack on all); W.Q.
Beardslee, The United States' Haiti Intervention: The Dangers of "Redefined"
National Security Interests, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 189, 195-96 (1996) (arguing that the 1994 intervention in Haiti should have been based on Article 51 of
the Charter, in order to avoid "the ambiguous and unclear reasoning" of the Security Council); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, InternationalLaw Governing Aid to Opposition Groups in Civil War: Resurrecting the Standards of Belligerency, 63
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under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, as well as under customary international law,"' it is doubtful whether the ECOMOG action can be based on this justification. 52 The requirement of an "armed
attack" appears to be fulfilled with evidence that the military action
started as a response to an attack by junta forces on an ECOMOG
military camp at Lungi." 3 The fact that the attacked ECOMOG forces
were on Sierra Leonean territory does not necessarily deprive them of
the right to exercise self-defense.254 Military units of a state or regional
organization abroad may use self-defense when attacked by forces of
the territorial state, provided their presence does not itself constitute an
armed attack, which would trigger the right of the territorial state to
respond pursuant to Article 5 L"' Whether the presence of ECOMOG
troops in Sierra Leone constituted an "armed attack" is open to debate
because the troops were originally based in Sierra Leone as a result of
a defense pact with President Kabbah's government.256 Alternatively,
the ECOMOG presence may have evolved into "armed attack" status

WASH. L. REV. 43, 49 (1988) (stating that the United States justified aid to Nicara-

guan contras based on the idea of collective self-defense).
251. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27) (commenting that Article 51 mentions the
"inherent right" of individual or collective self-defense); see also DINSTEIN, supra
note 110, at 182 (asserting that Article 51 permits self-defense exclusively where
an "armed attack" occurs and that many commentators believe that international
law permits the same).
252. See Beyerlin, supra note 179, at 108 (noting that Article 51 limits acts of
collective self-defense to external armed attacks).
253. See Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone of March 18, 1998, U.N. Doc. S/1998/249, at 1-2 [hereinafter Fourth Report]
(discussing fulfillment of the "armed attack" requirement).
254. See id. (discussing self-defense rights of military forces attacked on foreign
soil).
255. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS-A COMMENTARY 661, 670 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (discussing
authorization of the use of self-defense in response to an armed attack on foreign
soil provided the attack is not induced by foreign military presence).
256. See James Rupert, Sierra Leone Junta Leader Refuses to Abdicate Power:
Denial of Civilian Rule Stalls Regional Talks, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at A23
(reporting that ECOMOG troop presence in Sierra Leone may not necessarily
equate to an "armed attack" given the basis for the troops initial presence).
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when Nigeria launched air and naval attacks following the coup d'etat
and commenced massive troop deployments in Sierra Leone.25'
In any event, the extent and consequences of ECOMOG's response
to the attack of junta forces on one of their military camps is incompatible with the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality serves as a limitation on actions in self-defense, requiring that
defensive measures be reasonably related to the seriousness and scope
of the attack."' Because retaliation and punitive actions are prohibited,
military actions must be restricted to those necessary to repulse the
attack5 9 From the beginning, ECOMOG's large-scale use of counterforce was not simply aimed at repulsing the attack on its military
camps. 26° After four days of continued counter-strikes, ECOMOG's
Nigerian chief of staff, General Adul One Mohammed, made clear that
the troops sought a major military victory to weaken or oust the military government, and considered the situation "an opportunity to bring
sanity to the system."26' Military measures taken in defense can, under
certain circumstances, justify a counterattack against the "source" of
the attack to deter future aggression. ' 2 It is doubtful, however, that a

257. See id.
258. See Jost Delbriick, Proportionaliy, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1140, 1140-42 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2d ed. 1991) (discussing
the principle of proportionality); see also Schachter, supra note 108, at 1367; Randelzhofer, supra note 255, at 677 (explaining logic underlying principle of proportionality); see generally Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionalin"and Force in InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 391.413 (commenting on the importance of
proportionality in laws governing the use of force and armed conflict).
259. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27) (recognizing that a customary rule of international lav requires military action only to the extent necessary to prevent attack);
see also Kevin C. Kenny, Self-Defense, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES
AND PRACTICE 1162, 1168 (Riidiger Wolfrum & Christiane Philipp eds., 1995)
(asserting use of self-defense with military action is necessary to prevent further
attack).
260. See generally, James Rupert, Forces Press Sierra Leone Government; Nigerians, Rebels Attack for 6th Day, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1998, at A27 (noting Nigerian ECOMOG troops, under the pretext of peacekeeping, have avoided diplomatic
efforts in favor of assaults on military junta forces).
261. Id.

262. See

STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV,

SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF

FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1996) (describing the use of self-defense as a
preventive measure); see also Schachter, supra note 108, at 1638 (suggesting that
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broad understanding of proportionality applied to military units in the
territory of another state grants a right to at least temporarily occupy
the country and oust the regime from power. 263 Leaving aside earlier
ECOMOG military actions that were not responses to prior attacks,
the capture of the capital and removal of the junta from
power cannot
2
be justified as an exercise of the right to self-defense
3. HumanitarianIntervention

Another possible justification of the ECOWAS actions in Sierra
Leone is rooted in the notion of humanitarian intervention.2 65 The

humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone certainly deteriorated during
the nine months of Koromah's illegitimate rule. 66 Indeed, in passing
Resolution 1132, the Security Council expressly noted its concern
over "the continuing violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone [and

counter-attacks against military aggression constitutes justifiable self-defense);
DINSTEIN, supra note 110, at 231 (discussing self-defense by counter-attack as a
justifiable method of deterrence).
263. See, e.g., H.R. DOC. No. 101-127 (1990) (setting forth President Bush's
notification to Congress of deployment of United States troops to Panama as a justifiable large-scale intervention in the "exercise of the right of self-defense");
Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under InternationalLaw: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 306 (1991) (arguing that the favorable interpretation of the use of force in self-defense authorizes use of such force only
when responding to an armed attack); Tom J. Farer & Christopher C. Joyner, The
United States and the Use of Force: Looking Back to See Ahead, I TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 37 (1991) (analyzing the appropriateness of various
situations in which the United States used force); John Quigley, The Legalitv of the
United States Invasion of Panama, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 276, 294 (1990) (questioning the right of the United States in its use of force to invade Panama); see
generally Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Just Cause: The Tread that Runs so True, 13 DICK.
J. INT'L L. 1, 20 (1994) (analyzing the use of force).
264. Cf generally Quigley, supra note 263, at 276-94 (criticizing the use of
force as employed by the United States against Panama).
265. See Sierra Leone: Putting a Country Together, supra note 7, at 44 (referring to ECOWAS actions in Sierra Leone as humanitarian given the efforts to
bring food into the economically crippled region). Notably, food scarcity and lack
of medical provisions were major issues in Sierra Leone's rural areas. See id. (reporting 500,000 Sierra Leoneans were in desperate need of food prior to the
ECOMOG intervention).
266. See id. (noting that persistent clashes between rural based civil defense
forces, known as the Kamajors, and Koromah's military forces, left unknown
numbers dead, particularly around the heavily populated areas of Kenema and Bo).
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the] deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the country."" Even a
humanitarian crisis within Sierra Leone, however, may not be
enough to justify intervention.2 " The issue of whether and when humanitarian intervention is permissible under international law is
hotly disputed. 2 9 The fact that Nigeria's actions were unauthorized
by the United Nations Security Council renders a claim of justified
humanitarian intervention all the more precarious. To evaluate
whether the Nigerian intervention qualifies as a justifiable humanitarian intervention, it is first necessary to define what actions qualify
as "humanitarian intervention. 27 ' Having defined the term, the question remains when, if ever, is humanitarian intervention acceptable
under international law.27'
a. Humanitarian Intervention: Defining the Term
Traditionally, the term "humanitarian intervention" describes the
threat or use of force by a state or group of states, designed to compel a sovereign to respect fundamental human rights in the exercise
of its sovereign powers. 272 According to this classic definition, to
qualify as "humanitarian," the sole objective of the intervention must
be to either end or prevent human rights violations"' Recently, the
267. S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, at 2.

268. See Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN
WORLD POLITICS 95, 111 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984) (asserting that international law
does not provide a right of humanitarian intervention).
269. Compare Akehurst, supra note 268, at Ill (finding no right of humanitarian intervention in international law), with David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern
Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 264 (1992) (advocating an expanded scope for humanitarian intervention, including intervention
to repatriate refugees and to support anti-totalitarian rebellions).
270. See Akehurst, supra note 268, at 111.
271. See id. (considering when humanitarian intervention is acceptable under
international law).
272. See, e.g., Scheffer, supra note 269, at 264 (defining the term "humanitarian
intervention"); B. De Schutter, HumanitarianIntervention:A United Nations Task,
3 CAL. W. INT'L L. REV. 21, 24 (1972) (describing the elements of humanitarian
intervention); OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM & TOM WOODHOUsE, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION IN CONTEMPORARY CRISIS 3 (1996) (discussing actions that con-

stitute humanitarian intervention).
273. See Farer, supra note 130, at 122 (describing the narrow set of circumstances which qualify as humanitarian intervention).

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[14:321

idea of humanitarian intervention has expanded to cover interventions designed to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance'
to populations in dire need, as in the case of Somalia in 1992. 4
Some scholars suggest that a comprehensive definition of humanitarian assistance must account for situations similar to Somalia,
where humanitarian assistance is needed to avert mass starvation or
other immediate threats to life. Whether restricted to protecting
human rights against violations committed by a sovereign or expanded to cover the provision of assistance, the classical definition of
humanitarian intervention limits intervention to situations of pure
humanitarian concern. 76
In tension with the traditional conception is what some scholars
claim is a newly emerging right of humanitarian intervention to restore democracy.2 71 Under this analysis, the emerging right to democracy is a fundamental human right, the defense of which supports a
claim that intervention in a country's political affairs may be a form
of humanitarian intervention.2 78 Thus, the United States' intervention
in Panama, although overtly political, is defended by some as a form
of humanitarian intervention designed, among other things, to protect
a fundamental right to democratic governance. 27 9 There is some force
to this argument, particularly in light of the Security Council's

274. See Ruth E. Gordon, Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations:
Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 43, 44 (1996) (commenting on the expanding definition of humanitarian intervention).
275. See id. at 44-45 (asserting that the definition of "humanitarian intervention"
should be expanded to include termination of gross human rights violations, such
as that which occurred in Somalia); see also W. Michael Reisman, Conference
Proceedings, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 18
(Richard B. Lillich et al. eds., 1973) (advocating for a "pro filturo" definition of
humanitarian intervention which responds to the changing nature of humanitarian
crises).
276. See Gordon, supra note 274, at 44-45.
277. See Fielding, supra note 101, at 329 (arguing for expansion of definition of
humanitarian intervention to include efforts designed to restore democracy); Reisman, supra note 103, at 642 (suggesting that military efforts to restore democracy
be considered under an expanded definition of humanitarian intervention).
278. See Fielding, supra note 101, at 329.
279. See D'Amato, supra note 99, at 516 (arguing the United States' intervention in Panama could be considered humanitarian under an expanded definition
that includes protection of fundamental human right in democracy).
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authorization of U.S. intervention in Haiti, which arguably "extended
humanitarian intervention to include measures against the usurpation
of the sovereign prerogative of a population to be governed by those
it has democratically elected."2 0 The legal history of humanitarian
intervention, however, resists collapsing democratic intervention and
humanitarian intervention into one another.!" International law has
traditionally recognized an intervention to be humanitarian in nature
when the sole motivation is to terminate fundamental human rights
abuses or provide purely humanitarian aid including food and medicine. The right to democracy is not universally accepted, and it is
particularly doubtful whether it has gained the status of a fundamental human right capable of triggering a possible right of humanitarian
intervention.8 3 Consequently, intervention aimed at vindicating
democratic political ends is best understood as a "pro-democratic
intervention," not as humanitarian intervention.2" For this reason, the
United Nations' authorized intervention in Haiti is more accurately
described as an intervention to restore democracy than as a humanitarian mission.25

280. Fielding, supra note 101, at 329.
281. See generally Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne. The Customar" InternationalLaw
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current V'alidity Under the U.N.
Charter,4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1974) (surveying the history of humanitarian
interventions in international law).
282. See Nikolai Krylov, HumanitarianIntervention: Pros and Cons, 17 LoY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 365, 366 (1995) (establishing that the traditional notion
of humanitarian intervention recognizes interventions motivated by the termination
of gross human rights violations).
283. See Thomas Carothers, Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of
Democracy in InternationalLaw, 86 AM. SoC'Y INT'L PROC. 261 (1992) (recognizing the lack of universal acceptance of a right of democracy as a fundamental
human right).
284. See discussion iofra Part 1II.B.4 (questioning the idea of democratic intervention as humanitarian given the fact that democracy is not uniformly understood
as a fundamental human right)..
285. See generally Carothers, supra note 283, at 261 (utilizing the term "democratic intervention" rather than "humanitarian intervention" to describe efforts to
restore democracy).
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b. When is Humanitarian Intervention Permitted
under International Law?
Even if the international community of states once accepted a
customary doctrine of humanitarian intervention, it is not at all clear
that the doctrine survived the United Nations Charter." 6 Given the
recent United Nations authorized humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, however, it is possible to
conclude that humanitarian intervention may be legally authorized by
the Security Council.287 The legal status of unauthorized interventions, however, is tenuous.28
Prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter, a number of
international
military
missions were undertaken for humanitarian
289
18
reasons. From 1860 to 1861, France intervened with the deployment of 6,000 French troops when Turkish rule in Syria led to the
massacre of thousands of Maronite Christians.! In the 1870s, Russia
intervened to protect Christians in Bulgaria, Turkey, Bosnia, and
Herzegovina. 9 International jurists accepted this practice as legitimate.292
T

286. See Fonteyne, supra note 281, at 203 (asserting that the adoption of the
United Nations Charter ended any previously existing customary doctrine of humanitarian intervention).
287. See Douglas Eisner, Note, HumanitarianIntervention in the Post-Cold War
Era, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 195, 222 (1993) (suggesting that the events in Iraq, Somolia, and Yugoslavia may influence the Security Council to authorize humanitarian
intervention).
288. See generally id. at 223-24 (discussing the continuing tension between the
historic respect for non-intervention and the emerging principle of the subordination of state interest on humanitarian grounds). "China's Premier, Li Peng, ...
stress[ed] the importance of sovreignity [stating]: '[S]overeign equality of Member
States and non-interference in their internal affairs should be observed by all
Members without exception ....

The core of these principles was non-interference

in each others affairs."' Id. at 223 (quoting U.N. Press Release (PM Summary),
3046th mtg. at Take 2, U.N. Doc. SC/5361 (1992)).
289. See Krylov, supra note 282, at 369 (observing that humanitarian interventions occurred prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter without the need
for a written legal source authorizing such interventions).
290. See Scheffer, supra note 269, at 254 n.4 (describing France's 1860 invasion
of Turkish-ruled Syria as an example of humanitarian intervention occurring prior
to the adoption of the United Nations Charter).
291. See Krylov, supra note 282, at 369 (discussing Russian intervention in sev-
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The ratification of the United Nations Charter in 1945 severely
curtailed the legality of unilateral military actions, including humanitarian interventions.29 Article 2(4) clearly prohibits "the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state ... .,,2 This basic principle of non-intervention,
grounded in the norm of state sovereignty, regulates international
interventions in the post-Charter era. ' 5 A limitation on the principle
of non-intervention recognized in the United Nations Charter is
found in Chapter VII, which permits the Security council to authorize the use of force upon a finding of a threat or breach of international peace or when necessary for self-defense. It appears that with
the ratification of the United Nations Charter, humanitarian intervention is only justified when there is a clear finding that the humanitarian situation implicates international peace. Consequently,
the possibility of unilateral or unauthorized intervention appears
completely precluded by the United Nations Charter. "
Despite the almost universal adoption of the United Nations
Charter, unilateral humanitarian interventions have not disappeared
from the international scene. '9 Prominent examples of unauthorized
eral countries throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century as evidence of
accepted pre-United Nations Charter acts of humanitarian intervention).
292. See id. (noting acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a legitimate
practice). Lassa Oppenheim, for example, noted that when a state treats its nationals with cruelty "as would stagger humanity," the international community is
called upon to intervene and compel the offending state to establish legal order
"sufficient to guarantee to its citizens an existence more adequate to the ideas of
modem civilization." LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (1905).
293. See Krylov, supra note 282, at 371 (observing that the United Nations
Charter is focused on peaceful resolution of problems and is against the use of
force to resolve such problems).
294. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
295. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100 (June 27) (confirming the prohibition of the use of
force by one state against another).
296. See Krylov, supra note 282, at 377 (justifying humanitarian intervention
only when international peace is implicated).
297. See Tuomala, supra note 263, at 15 (asserting that the United Nations
Charter changed traditional international law by denying the right of nations to use
unilateral intervention).
298. See generally RAMSBOTHAM &

WOODHOUSE,

supra note 272, at 4 (pro-
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actions include the intervention by Tanzania in Uganda in 197999

and the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971.'0° Despite credible claims of a threat to international peace caused by the regional
instability and flights of refugees, the General Assembly criticized
both these actions as unauthorized interference with state sovereignty.'"' There is little doubt, however, that both actions prevented
further loss of life.302
Some commentators suggest that such unilateral actions should not
be judged in terms of the prohibition contained in the United Nations
Charter because the Security Council deadlocked during the 1970s
and did not reach any decision concerning humanitarian intervention. When the Security Council is unable to authorize intervention
due to internal political squabbles, it is legitimate for a state to act
unilaterally to end gross violation of human rights in another state,

particularly when international peace is threatened.i

M

If inaction by the Security Council in the 1970s and early 1980s
justified unilateral humanitarian interventions, the same is not true of
viding examples of unilateral humanitarian interventions that occurred since the
adoption of the United Nations Charter).
299. See id. Amin's regime engaged in extreme, widespread human rights
abuses in Uganda from 1971-79. See id. It is estimated that 300,000 Ugandans
were executed and thousands more were expelled until Tanzania invaded Uganda
and overthrew Amin's government in 1979. See id. Amin fled into exile in Malawi
and Tanzania withdrew. See id.
300. See Scheffer, supra note 269, at 254 n.4 (outlining the West Pakistan
army's engagement in mass killings, rape, and pillage in East Pakistan subsequent
to its demand for independence). In response, India invaded and defeated the West
Pakistan forces, ultimately allowing for the birth of the nation of Bangladesh. See
id.
301. See Michael J. Bazyler, Re-examining the Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L.
547, 588 (1987).
302. See RAMSBOTHAM & WOODHOUSE, supra note 272, at 4 (asserting Tanzania's intervention in Uganda prevented further loss of life); Scheffer, supra note
269, at 254 n.4 (arguing that India's unauthorized intervention in Pakistan prevented loss of lives).
303. See sources cited supra notes 147-48 (providing the arguments presented
by various scholars).
304. See generally Tuomala, supra note 263, at 15-17 (stating that the Security
Council's role in the authorization of intervention is to promote international
peace).
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the 1990s.305 With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council repeatedly proved itself able and willing to authorize humanitarian intervention? ° The United Nations authorized humanitarian interventions in Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.""' The
situations in Iraq and Yugoslavia had sufficiently clear repercussions
in neighboring countries to create a threat to international peace.
The situation in Somalia, however, was an internal crisis and the fact
that the Security Council authorized intervention suggests an expansion of the concept of a threat to international peace." Somalia's internal humanitarian crisis was considered so severe that it constituted
a threat to internal peace in and of itself."' Given the Security Council's willingness to authorize intervention when a humanitarian crisis
demands, it is possible to argue that there is no longer a justification
for unilateral humanitarian interventions. Accordingly, the customary
doctrine of humanitarian intervention did not survive the broad prohibition of intervention found in Article 2(4)."'
M

305. See Eisner, supra note 287, at 213 (describing authorized interventions occurring in the 1990s).
306. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing the Security Council
imposition of economic embargoes).
307. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/688 (1991)
(concerning intervention in Iraq); see also S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg.
at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) (addressing intervention in Somalia); G.A. Res
713, 3009th mtg. at 45, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3009 (1991) (regarding the intervention in
former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 929, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/929 (1994) (concerning intervention in Rwanda); see generally SEAN D.
MURPHY,

HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTION-THE

UNITED

NATIONS

IN

AN

EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 165 (1996) (discussing authorized interventions).
308. See Eisner, supra note 287, at 214-18 (discussing the situations in Iraq and
Somalia and the ensuing effects on neighboring countries).
309. See Gordon, supra note 274, at 51.
310. See id. (reasoning that Somalia's internal crisis created a per se threat to
peace).
311. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and FutureDevelopmnents in InternationalLaw, 60 ALB. L. REV. 571, 573 (1997) (arguing that
the Security Council's apparent willingness to authorize humanitarian interventions should eliminate the need for justifiable unilateral humanitarian interventions); BROWVNLIE, supra note 135, at 342 (suggesting that there is less need for
unilateral humanitarian interventions); DINSTEIN, supra note 110, at 91 (commenting on the new conceptual approach to humanitarian interventions); M.J.
Levitin, 7Tze Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada. the Falklands, and
HumanitarianIntervention, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 621, 652 (1986) (describing the
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c. Application of The Law on Humanitarian Intervention to Sierra
Leone
From a definitional perspective, the Nigerian intervention in Sierra
Leone does not qualify as a humanitarian intervention. The classic
definition of "humanitarian intervention" applies only to situations
where fundamental human rights are at stake or in situations requiring emergency provisions. 312 In Sierra Leone, the intervention's
manifest objective was to restore the government of exiled President
Kabbah." 3 Nigeria immediately made this position clear by announcing that it would not withdraw from Sierra Leone until Kabbah's restoration to power." 4 Furthermore, even assuming that Sierra
Leone faced humanitarian crisis due to dwindling food supplies, the
crisis was largely the creation of ECOWAS and United Nations imposed sanctions.3"5 Consequently, a strange twist on traditional notions of state sovereignty would have to exist, allowing one state to
invade another in order to rectify a humanitarian crisis that the intervening state created. 1 6 The Nigerian intervention, thus, cannot in
good faith be called a humanitarian intervention."'
Even if the traditional definition of humanitarian intervention were
expanded to include political actions to restore democracy, the Nigerian action still fails to pass the test for the legality of humanitarian

expanded approach to humanitarian intervention).
312. See Krylov, supra note 282, at 366 (defining traditional notion of humanitarian intervention); see also Rupert, supra note 256, at A23 (reporting that the
original reason for Nigeria's placement of troops in Sierra Leone did not qualify as
humanitarian intervention).
313. See Rupert, supra note 260, at A27 (articulating the purpose of Nigerian
intervention in Sierra Leone).
314. See Alec Russell, Nigeria Pledges to Oust Freetown Coup Leader, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, June 13, 1997, at 17 (reaffirming Nigeria's goal in the Sierra Leone
intervention).
315. See SierraLeone: Putting a Country Together, supra note 7, at 44.
316. See Krylov, supra note 282, at 369 (commenting that humanitarian intervention trumps state sovereignty where a state frequently disregards the inherent
rights of its own citizens).
317. See Sierra Leone: Putting a Country Together, supra note 7, at 44 (concluding that Nigerian troops induced the economically depressed situation in Sierra
Leone).
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intervention."' Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter represents
a broad prohibition on forceful, unilateral interventions in the territory or politics of another state."" Although some scholars find unilateral actions acceptable in Uganda'" and Panama,'' such interventions occurred at a time when the Security Council was unable to
take effective action.3 " Recent interventions in Somalia and Iraq indicate that the Security Council is able to act when it finds a credible
threat to international peace, thus closing the door on the only justification of unilateral humanitarian intervention.'"' Even if the definition of humanitarian intervention were expanded beyond that which
is currently accepted by the international legal community, without
the authorization of the Security Council, the actions of Nigeria are
not a legitimate form of humanitarian intervention.'24 Although the
Security Council did find both a threat to regional peace and a grave
humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone, it only authorized economic
sanctions.-2 Stopping short of authorizing military intervention, the
Security Council deprived Nigeria of any means of characterizing its
actions as a legal humanitarian intervention.'2'

318. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the use of force "against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations").
319. See id.
320. See TES6N, supra note 9, at 195 (arguing that the unilateral attack in
Uganda qualifies as a permissible intervention).
321. See D'Amato, supra note 99, at 516 (supporting the Panamanian intervention despite the United States unilateral act).
322. See generally Tuomala, supra note 263 (suggesting that interventions in the
1970s should not be considered violations against the prohibition of unilateral action due to the existing Security Council's indecision).
323. See generally Eisner, supra note 287, at 215, 219-20 (describing situations
where the Security Council took action in conflicts deemed detrimental to international peace).
324. See Rupert, supra note 256, at A23 (discussing the reasons for the Nigerian
presence in Sierra Leone and the lack of proper Security Council authorization for
such presence).
325. See S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, paras. 8-10 (outlining the Security
Council's authorization of economic, not humanitarian, sanctions in Sierra Leone).
326. See id. (describing the lack of proper authorization for humanitarian intervention).
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4. The Right of Pro-DemocraticIntervention
The primary justification offered by Nigeria and ECOWAS for the
military intervention in Sierra Leone was the overthrow of the military
junta and the restoration of the democratically elected government of
President Kabbah.327 This attempt to justify the use of force raises
questions concerning the existence of a general right of prodemocratic intervention under international law in the absence of prior
Security
Council authorization similar to that of the Haitian interven32
tion. 1
Pro-democratic intervention, like the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, is difficult to reconcile with the prohibition on the use of
force of Article 2(4).329 The relatively recent concept of interventions
to restore democracy can be distinguished from the classical theory
of humanitarian intervention, which concerns the use of force to
protect those in imminent danger of death or grave injury."" Prodemocratic intervention differs from humanitarian intervention in
that dictators, as the targets of such force, were engaged in oppressive acts against the populace rather than perpetrating fundamental
human rights violations."' Generally, the doctrine of pro-democratic
intervention concerns the use of force to assist oppressed populations
in attaining the right of democratic self-government. 332 In particular,
however, the concept of pro-democratic intervention comprises

327. See Russell, supra note 314, at 17 (describing Nigeria's commitment to
overthrowing the military junta in Sierra Leone).
328. See Scheffer, supra note 269, at 264 (questioning unauthorized intervention
for pro-democratic reasons instead of intervention for humanitarian purposes).
329. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting use of force generally with
the narrow exception of humanitarian intervention with Security Council approval).
330. See Malvina Halberstam, The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 3
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 7-8 (1995) (describing distinction between prodemocratic intervention and classical humanitarian intervention).
331. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of Intervention in InternationalLaw, in EMERGING NORMS OF JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION 91, 97 (Laura W.

Reed & Carl Kaysen eds., 1993) (distinguishing humanitarian intervention from
pro-democratic intervention).
332. See id. (defining the purposes of pro-democratic intervention broadly).
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military interventions by third states to restore a democratic government overthrown by a coup d'tat.3"
The majority of international legal scholars consider pro-democratic
intervention in the absence of Security Council authorization incompatible with the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of
nonintervention and, thus, illegal under contemporary international
law.334 The overwhelmingly positive international reaction following
restoration of the democratically elected government in Sierra Leone
suggests a need to review the legality of the doctrine of prodemocratic intervention."' In light of international reactions and the
military intervention, it appears appropriate to seek a legal construction reconciling the right of pro-democratic intervention with the prohibition on the use of force of Article 2(4) and with recent state practice.336 This search is justified by the need to keep international law in
conformity with the realities of international relations."' Such confor-

333. See generally Tuomala, supra note 263, at 26-27 (offering various definitions of humanitarian intervention that would include intervention to overthrow a
military government).
334. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT
MIGHT-INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE

V.

37, 44 (Louis Henkin et

al. eds., 1991) (asserting the illegality of pro-democratic intervention under modem international law); Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-DemocraticIntervention, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 649 (1984) (arguing that intervention based on prodemocratic initiatives cannot be reconciled with current international law); Franck,
supra note 102, at 85 (opposing notion of pro-democratic intervention); DINSTEIN,
supra note 110, at 89 (citing the United Nations Charter's prohibition on the use of
force to support argument that pro-democratic intervention does not justify intervention in political affairs of another country); SHAW, supra note 88, at 803 (opposing pro-democratic intervention); Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States
Intervention in Panana Under International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 498
(1990) (criticizing the United States' pro-democratic intervention in Panama); cf
Tuomala, supra note 263, at 26 (specifying the narrow exceptions to humanitarian
intervention under which pro-democracy efforts might be included).
335. See French, supra note 6,at A3 (hailing Nigerians for freeing Sierra Leone
from military rule); cf Claudia McElroy, Nigeria 'sIntervention Puile West Africans, GUARDIAN, June 28, 1997, at 17 (observing that criticisms of Nigeria's presence in Sierra Leone are aimed at Nigeria rather that the intervention itself).
336. See Wolfgang Friedmann, The ChangingDimensions of InternationalLaw,
62 COLUM. L. REv. 1146, 1155 (1962) (suggesting necessity for flexible interpretations of international law to accommodate changing times).
337. See id. (describing shifting nature of international relations as justification
for revisions to international law).
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mity ensures the effectiveness of the international legal order by providing stability to the inherently fragile international system. " '
a. Restoring Democracy as a Justification for Military
Interventions-Inconclusive State Practice Prior to the End of the
Cold War
The most notable examples of military interventions prior to the
end of the Cold War in which the right of pro-democratic intervention was invoked are the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama-all of them involving armed interventions by the United
States.339 In 1963, a civilian junta overthrew the freely elected government of President Bosch of the Dominican Republic. Three years
later, the junta suffered the same destiny and was overthrown by a
military revolt, leading to the immediate outbreak of civil war between
rival military factions. On April 28, 1965 United States troops landed
in the country, primarily to secure the evacuation of foreign nationals.140 During the Security Council debates, however, the representative of the United States also justified the military intervention on
grounds
closely related to the doctrine of pro-democratic interven3 41
tion.

338. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. 173, 178 (Apr. 11) ("Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life .... ").
339. See generally Eisner, supra note 287, at 206-08 (analyzing interventions of
Grenada and Panama by the United States); Ved. P. Nanda, The United States Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact in World Order-Part11, 44 DENV. L.J.
225, 273 (1967) (describing the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic).
340. See Nanda, supra note 339, at 273 (describing the events surrounding the
United States military intervention in the Dominican Republic).
341. The United States representative stated:
We believe that the Dominican people, under the established principle of selfdetermination, should select their own government through free elections... Our interest lies in the re-establishment of constitutional government and, to that end, to assist in maintaining the stability essential to the expression of the free choice of the
Dominican people.
Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of
the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 227 (1985).
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The reaction of other states to the intervention was, with very few
exceptions, overwhelmingly negative. Although the protest did not
amount to an official condemnation through the United Nations, states
generally viewed the military action as a violation of the principle of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. *:
Grenada provides a second example of pro-democratic intervention .4 3 The New Jewel Movement, under the leadership of Maurice
Bishop, ousted the elected Prime Minister, Sir Eric Gairy, in 1979.""
After increasing disagreement among the members of the new "People's Revolutionary Government," a military revolt ousted Bishop
from power in October 1983." Members of the Grenadian People's
Revolutionary Army formed a Revolutionary Military Council as the
new government of the island.46 On October 25, 1983, the United
States, supported by Jamaica, Barbados, and member states of the Organization of East Caribbean States ("OECS"), launched Operation
Urgent Fury. 47 The participating states justified the military intervention by pointing to, inter alia, the need to restore the constitutional order as a prerequisite for democracy in Grenada."' President Reagan
342. For an overview of the diplomatic reactions, see Doswald-Beck, supra note
341, at 228. For a critical evaluation of the intervention, see Nanda, supra note
339.
343. See generally, Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Decision to Invade Grenada:A Ten-Year Retrospective, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 765, 768-71 (describing three justifications for United States intervention in Grenada).
344. See Christopher C. Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Laifulness of the hIvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 132 (detailing the
events leading to anti-democracy sentiment in Grenada).
345. See id.
346. See id. at 131-32 (discussing the formation of the Revolutionary Military
Council).
347. See id. at 132 (attributing the purpose of the organization on rescuing foreign nationals and increasing regional security).
348. As Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica noted, -[i]f we ignore the occurrence of
brutal military takeovers or political overthrows of Governments, we would immediately give heart to every subversive group within the region to engineer disorders and
instability as a means of overthrows. Address to the Jamaican House of Representafives of 25 October 1983, reprinted in WILLIAM C. GtLMORE, THE GRENADA
INTERVENTION-ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION 98, 101 (1984); see also Address
to the BarbadianPeople by Prime MinisterAdams of 26 October 1983, reprinted in
id. at 102; Press releaseof the Organizationof Eastern CaribbeanStates of 31 October 1983, reprintedin id. at 106.
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justified the use of force as necessary "to assist in the restoration of
conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, where a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized
,,349
power ....
The vast majority of states, including close allies of the United
States, again characterized the intervention as illegal and found the
justifications offered unconvincing and without legal basis in international law.35 ° This general sentiment is echoed in the legal literature
addressing the intervention in Grenada.3" ' The United Nations General
Assembly, in Resolution 38/7, condemned the military intervention as
a "flagrant violation of international law and the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Grenada, and called for an "immediate cessation of the armed
intervention and the immediate withdrawal
352
troops.
of the foreign
A final case worth noting in the history of pro-democratic intervention is Operation Just Cause, the U.S. military invasion of Panama in
December 1989."' 3 Tensions grew between the United States and the

349. Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy Revisited: 'Pro-Democratic"
Armed Intervention in the Post-Bipolar World, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.

PROB. 481, 488 (1993).
350. For the overwhelmingly negative reactions of the international community,
see SCOTT DAVIDSON, GRENADA - A STUDY IN POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (1987). See also Laura Wheeler, The Grenada Invasion:
Expanding the Scope of HumanitarianIntervention, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

413, 414-15 (1985) (contending that the United States was unjustified in their intervention in Grenada).
351.

See, e.g., Francis A. Boyle, InternationalLawlessness in Grenada, 78 AM.

J. INT'L L. 172 (1984) (expressing negative reaction to United States' intervention
in Grenada); Richard Falk, The Decline of Normative Restraint in International

Relations, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 263, 265 (1985) (characterizing United States intervention in Grenada as inappropriate); Joyner, supra note 344; John Quigley, The
United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger than Fiction, 18 U. MIAMI INTER.-

AM. L. REV. 271, 351 (1986-87); William C. Plouffe, Sovereignty in the "New
World Order": The Once and Future Position of the United States, a Merlinesque
Task of Quasi-Legal Definition 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 49, 65 (1996); cf
Beck, supra note 343, at 817 (questioning the political underpinning in interna-

tional law of United States' Grenada invasion).
352. G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, at 19, U.N. Doc.
A/38/47 (1983).
353. See David J.Scheffer, Use of Force After the Cold War: Panama,Iraq, and
the New World Order, in RIGHT V. MIGHT-INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
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authoritarian Panamanian government after General Noriega nullified
the election of the opposition candidate Guillermo Endara in May
19893M Noriega's alleged participation in drug trafficking and Panamanian sponsored violence against U.S. soldiers further intensified the
situation.355 On December 20, 1989, the United States sent 14,000
troops to join troops already stationed in Panama under the terms of
the Panama Canal treaties, invaded Panama, and arrested General
Noriega.356
One of the United States' justifications for the military intervention
was to restore the democratic process in the country. Before the Organization of American States ("OAS"), the United States representative stated:
Today we are once again living in historic times: A time when a great
principle is spreading across the world like wildfire. That principle, as we
all know, is the revolutionary idea that the people-not governments-are
sovereign .... [This principle] has in this decade--and especially in this
historic year 1989-acquired the force of historic necessity .... Democracy today is synonymous with legitimacy the world over; it is, in short,
the universal value of our time.

President Bush expressly justified United States action on the ground
of restoring democracy to Panama.35"
The intervention was overwhelmingly condemned as a clear violation of international law by the international community ' and by in-

FORCE 109, 118 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
354. Seeid. at 112-13.
355. See id. at 112.
356. Seeid. at 118.
357. Statement of Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS,
on 21 December 1989, reprintedin Scheffer, supra note 353, at 119.
358. See Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in
Panama, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1974-75 (Dec. 20, 1989).
359. For an overview of the reactions of the international community, see
ALEXANDROV, supra note 262, at 201. See also David W. Alberts, The United
States Invasion of Panama: Unilateral Alilitar " Intervention to Effectuate a
Change in Governent-A Continuum of Laisfidness, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 261, 286 (1991) (stating the international community condemned
"Operation Just Cause" as a violation of international law).
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ternational legal scholars."' The United Nations General Assembly
and the OAS strongly condemned the invasion as a violation of international law and demanded the withdrawal of all invasion forces.' 6'
The attempt to justify the military action as an attempt to restore the
democratic process in Panama was widely criticized as incompatible
with existing international rules governing the use of force. 62
State practice concerning the right of pro-democratic interventions
before the 1990s is far from conclusive and does not provide strong
support for the existence of such a right under international law.1 The
international community reacted with hostility against the interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama." This in itself
limits their potential precedental value. 6 ' There are, however, also
360. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 263, at 312; Schachter, supra note 112, at
428; Brownlie, supra note 117, at 207; Franck, supra note 102, at 84; Nanda, supra note 339, at 502; Scheffer, supra note 353, at 119; Rumage, supra note 112, at
74.

361. See G.A. Res. 240/44, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 52, U.N.
Doe. A/RES/44/240 (1989) (reaffirming Panama's right to develop its political
system without foreign interference); Serious Events in the Republic of Panama,
OEA/Ser.G, CP/RES.534 (800/89) corr. 1, O.A.S., Wash., D.C. (prov. ed. Dec. 22,
1989); see also Tuomala, supra note 263, at 9 (noting the that the United Nations
General Assembly condemned the invasion by a vote of 75 to 20 and the OAS censured the United States by a vote of 20 to 1).
362. See Henkin, supra note 263, at 297; Nanda, supra note 334, at 498;
Rumage, supra note 112, at 57; Scheffer, supra note 353, at 119; Tuomala, supra
note 263, at 27; also Francis A. Boyle, The U.S. Invasion of Panama:Implications
for hIternationalLaw and Politics, 1 EAST AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 80, 83
(1993); Plouffe, supra note 351, at 71.
363. See Nanda, supra note 334, at 489 (noting state practice does not support
an expansive reading of the United Nations Charter advocating use of force to restore freedom and democracy).
364. See Alberts, supra 359, at 277, 287 (condemning invasions as violations of
international law).
365. For a discussion concerning the legal effect of protests by states in inhibiting the formation of new norms of customary international law, see CHARLES G.
FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (4th ed. 1965); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a

Source ofInternationalLaw, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 38 (1974-75) (emphasizing
that rules originating in the voluntary practice of a small group of states and gradually adopted by others until becoming accepted law are inherently uncertain). But
see ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98

(1971) (stating that states cannot block the formation of customary law merely by
protesting against them); Fidler, supra note 160, at 202 (contrasting the differences
between generality and uniformity in state practices).
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other reasons why these cases cannot serve as a basis for a right to restore democracy through military intervention.
First, although the above mentioned interventions were arguably
designed, at least in part, to establish a democratic government, ' the
concept of pro-democratic intervention has never been used as the
primary legal justification for the use of force. ' The prominent justifications in all cases, with some slight modifications, have been, inter
alia, the right to protect nationals abroad, self-defense, invitation by
the lawful authorities, and, in the case of Panama, a treaty right of intervention, based on the Panama Canal treaties."' Thus, there has
never been a claim, other than the case of Sierra Leone, that the right
to restore democracy alone, or at least as used as the primary basis,
justified armed intervention by a foreign state.""
Second, the interventions in the Dominican Republic and Grenada, following the communist revolution in Cuba and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, must be viewed as advancing American foreign
policy goals. These interventions are consistent with U.S. supported
interventions in Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1960, and the support of
the "Contras" in Nicaragua in the early 1980s.'" The motivation for all
of these interventions included the policy goal "to prevent interference
in Western Hemisphere affairs by the international communist movement."37' Thus, the value of these interventions as state practices sup366. Cf David Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications fbr
MilitaryIntervention in Iternal Conflict, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435, 457

(1996) (discussing criticisms of United States military intervention in foreign
countries).
367. See Schachter, supra note 149, at 143 (labeling this justification as "oratorical flourishes"); cf Roth, supra note 349, at 487 (comparing the incident in
Panama to the situation in Grenada).
368. See Rumage, supra note 112, at 43.
369. Cf Franck, supra note 102, at 71 (illustrating the United States rationales
of humanitarian concerns along with restoration of democracy as reasons for the
intervention).
370. See generally, Roth, supra note 349, at 513 (justifying American intervention in foreign states).
371. See S. CON. REs. 91, 83d Cong., 68 Stat. 1351 (1954) (citing the congressional resolution following the invasion of Guatemala by a United States-supported
army for the purpose of ousting the leftist government of President Jacobo Arbenz
Guzman); see generally Isaak I. Dore, The United States, Self-Defense and the
U.N. Charter:A Comment on Principlesand Expediency in Legal Reasoning, 24
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porting the right to pro-democratic intervention must be judged in
light of the special circumstances governing the bipolar power struggle
during the Cold War and the "backyard" security interests of the
United States.
Finally, all three interventions took place in a limited regional
area, namely Central America and the Caribbean. In effect, all were
undertaken by a single power, the United States, with the exception
of Grenada, which involved limited participation by a regional organization.372 Thus, even assuming the legality of pro-democratic interventions based on these cases, the recognition of such a right
would be limited to Central America and would carry no substantial
implications for the validity of pro-democratic interventions in other
parts of the world.
b. Consent of the Legitimate Government as the Decisive Factor
The analyzed state practice does not provide substantive support for
a general right of pro-democratic intervention in the absence of an
authorization by the Security Council. Accordingly, it is still necessary
to find a legal construction capable of explaining the changed reactions of the international community from condemnation in the earlier
cases to acceptance in the 1990s, following the military interventions
to restore democracy in Haiti and Sierra Leone.3 73 In searching for a
legal basis, the legal significance of the fact that immediately following the coup d'&tat, President Kabbah appealed to ECOWAS Chairman, General Sani Abacha of Nigeria, for immediate74assistance to restore civilian rule in Sierra Leone, must be evaluated.

J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1987) (developing "U.S. hemisphere interventions from
1954 to present").
372. See Joyner, supra note 344, at 149 (characterizing United States activity as
an affirmative response to appeals from the OECS and Governor-General of Grenada).
373. See Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community After Haiti: Rethinking the Collective Use of Force, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 70, 72 (1984) (urging the reconceptualization of traditional rules).
STAN.

374. See Jonah, May 27 Press Conference, supra note 164; see also Goldman,
supra note 34, at 3 (describing a situation where a nation's government seeks foreign military intervention to restore order); Tran & McElroy, supra note 24, at 4
(citing U.N failure to act as one of the causes of unrest in Sierra Leone).

1998]

MILITARY INTER VENTION IN SIERRA LEONE

387

The concept of "intervention by invitation of the government" is
widely recognized, 37 though disputed, in state practice and the literature as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention. 176 Although the United Nations Charter does
not expressly mention intervention with the consent or upon the request of the government as an exception to the prohibition on the use
of force, international law recognizes that a state can consent to activities of other states on its territory)77 The principle of consent may be
regarded as operating as an independent principle under international
law, compatible with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.?
Thus, a military intervention by a state based on the request or consent
of the government does not amount to a violation of Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, while aid to rebel groups by third states is
generally regarded as illegal under international law." The International Court of Justice expressed this view in the Nicaraguan case
when it stated that "intervention is allowable at the request of the gov-

375. See U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1906th mtg. at I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/387 (1976)
(stating that it is "the inherent and lawful right of every State, in the exercise of its
sovereignty, to request assistance from any other state or group of states"); see also
JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 88, at 435 (acknowledging the use of requests for
assistance); BROWNLIE, supra note 135, at 317; Schachter, supra note 108, at
1645; Joyner, supra note 344, at 137-38; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
INA DIVIDED WORLD 241 (1986); SHAW, supra note 88, at 801; Skubiszewski, sitpra note 126, at 749.
376. See WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (6th ed.
1909) (discussing the uncertainty over the legality of intervention by invitation).
Compare Michael Akehurst, Civil War, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 597, 599 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992) (questioning the
competence of a state government which is in the process of being overthrown),
with Richard Falk, The Complexities of HunanitarianIntervention:A NewI World
Order Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491, 502 (1996) (contending that consent
by the target country legitimizes the intervention).
377. See Joyner, supra note 344, at 138 (arguing that the legality of intervention
based on invitation for assistance is "well grounded in international law").
378. See Brownlie, supra note 117, at 208-09. But see Henkin, supra note 263,
at 299 n.25 (condemning state invasion of another even where the target state approves).
379. See Stephen M. Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention ant SelfDefrnse in
Modern InternationalLaw, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 411,483-86 (1972 111; SHAW,
supra note 88, at 795-97; Randelzhofer, supra note 92, at 121 (citing possible exception to the general rule in connection with "wars of national liberation").
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enment. '3 ° Consequently, an armed intervention that is consistent
with the will of the government of the state concerned does not constitute an enforcement action under Article 53(2) of the United Nations Charter and does not require an authorization by the Security
Council."' Although the doctrine of intervention by invitation is generally regarded as part of international law, the question remains
whether President Kabbah's request for foreign military2 assistance
constituted a valid "invitation" by the lawful government.1
c. Did President Kabbah Remain the Legitimate Government of
Sierra Leone After the Coup d'Etat?
The legality of a military intervention, under the doctrine of intervention by invitation, turns on the existence of a valid consent by a legitimate government. As Louise Doswald-Beck points out, the primary task in this inquiry is the "identification of the 'government' of a
State as the State's valid representative in international law." ' There
are serious doubts as to whether to consider President Kabbah the head
of the government of Sierra Leone with authority to invite foreign intervention because Kabbah was already
in exile in Guinea when he
38 4
appealed to ECOWAS for assistance.
Under the traditional and prevailing international legal doctrine, the
government of a state is determined according to who maintains effective control of the state territory and the people therein.'" Effectiveness as the sole criterion in recognizing a government of a state has
380. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.

v.

U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126 (June 27).
381. Jochen A. Frowein, Legal Consequences for International Law Enforcement in Case of Security Council Inaction, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT: NEW SCENARIOS-NEW LAW 111, 120 (Jost Delbriick ed.,

1993); Nolte, supra note 74, at 622.
382. See generally HALL, supra note 376, at 286; Doswald-Beck, supra note
341, at 190 (discussing the importance of state representation in legitimizing intervention).
383.
114.
384.
appeal
385.
at 424;

Doswald-Beck, supra note 341, at 192; see Schachter, supra note 238, at
See generally Goldman, supra note 34, at 3 (describing President Kabbah's
for help while in exile).
See JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 88, at 150; Schachter, supra note 112,
SHAW, supra note 88, at 800.
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been widely recognized in state practice, as well as the judgments of
international tribunals and among international legal scholars."'
Whether a group of nationals obtained power by overthrowing the
former government in a coup d 'tat is legally irrelevant and does not
affect the legitimacy7 of the government in representing the state and
acting on its behalf.1
Reliance on de facto control rather than constitutionality is based on
practical considerations."' To cooperate effectively in the international
system, states cannot ignore the existence of an effective government
or deny its capacity to represent the state in the international realm."'
According to traditional international law, an effective government
may legitimately request foreign military assistance only to suppress
limited civil strife.39 As soon as an internal conflict becomes widespread and rebel forces control parts of the state territory, it is doubtful
that a third state may still come to the aid of the challenged incumbent
government without violating the principle of non-intervention."' This
restriction is grounded in the belief that increased internal challenges
lead to the decline of the government's ability to effectively control
the territory and to speak for the state. ': In these situations, the effec-

386. See, e.g., Tinoco Concession Case (U.K. v. Costa Rica), I R.I.A.A. 369,

381-82 (1923);

SATYAVRATA RAMDAS PATEL, RECOGNITION IN THE LAW OF

NATIONS 83 (1959); GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 75

(7th ed.

1996); SHAW, supra note 88, at 304.
387. See David Wippman, Militari, Intervention, Regional Organizations, and
Host-State Consent, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 212 (1996) (stressing effecfive control as the test for determining the existence of government).
388. See id. (stating that "effective control serves as a rough proxy for the existence of some degree of congruity between the government and the larger political
community of the state, which supports the government's claim to represent the
state as a whole").
389. See TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 129
(1951) (recognizing the general acceptance that state can maintain international
relations even with a decentralized system). Furthermore, as David Wippman
notes, the criterion of effective control offers a "reasonably objective and externally verifiable basis for determining governmental authority, thus 'inhibiting intervention' by outside states." Wippman, supra note 387, at 212.
390. See JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 88, at 437.
391. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 341, at 251; JENNINGS & WATTS, supra
note 88, at 437-38; Skubiszewski, supra note 126, at 750.
392. See Wippman, supra note 366, at 440; see also Joseph H. Weiler, Armed

390
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tive control doctrine undermines the ability of the individual, or group
of nationals, to remain the lawful government of the state. 93 The former government may merely be one contender, among many, for
power and thus lose its right to request help from outside in the name
of the state.394
State practice appears to support a broader principle regarding the
violent overthrow of a de jure government. Foreign states may intervene in support of the de jure government, as long as there is only a
brief discontinuity in the de jure government's effective control of the
state territory and the restoration is realizable with very limited military action. 95 The United Kingdom and France have frequently assisted governments in their former colonies threatened by mutinous
troops without condemnation from the international community. 9 '
These actions, however, involved limited military measures and little
resistance from the mutineers."'
The situation in Sierra Leone following the coup d'etat, however,
does not fall into this category. President Kabbah was already in exile
in Guinea when he made his plea to ECOWAS for assistance. Kabbah's government had lost complete control over the territory of Sierra
Leone at the time of his request for assistance. Furthermore, the early
attempts to oust the junta from power, undertaken primarily by Nigeria
in the week following the coup, completely failed despite the use of

Intervention in a Dichotomized World: The Case of Grenada, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 241, 254 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986);
ANTONIO TANCA, FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 23
(1993).
393. See TANCA, supra note 392, at 23 (doubting whether a government plagued
by internal strife has the authority to ask for foreign assistance).
394. See Nolte, supra note 74, at 622.
395. See Wippman, supra note 387, at 216-17 (finding most state treat the disruptions as limited and not indicative of the de jure government's ability to represent the state).
396. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 106, at 796; Wippman, supra note 387, at
216.
397. For a description of the British suppression of the army mutiny in Tanganyika in January 1964, see Reisman, supra note 106, at 796. "Julius Nyerere, the
President, turned to Britain for aid and a small contingent of Royal Marines flew in
and suppressed the mutiny in one day. The death toll amounted to three mutinous
soldiers killed. There were no civilian injuries and no marine casualties." Id.
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considerable military power.39 ' The military junta had effective control
over large parts of Sierra Leone's territory, including the state capital,
despite the continued presence of Nigerian troops in the country. Under traditional international law, the military junta must therefore be
considered the government of Sierra Leone, at least from the time it
successfully resisted its overthrow by Nigerian troops. Consequently,
any request for assistance by President Kabbah is invalid and any
military aid, particularly foreign military interventions, is illegal under
traditional international law. 3"
The traditional doctrine of "effective control" faces new challenges
and is open to critical reexamination in light of current developments
in the practice of states since the beginning of the 1990s. "' The overthrow and restoration of the Haitian President, Aristide, marks the first
example in what may cautiously be viewed as a turning point in the
determination of the legitimate government of a state under international law. '
Aristide became President of Haiti in 1990 after winning internationally monitored and supervised elections.*2 Months later, a military
coup d'etat overthrew Aristide and forcing him to flee the country.
Although the junta effectively controlled the territory of Haiti and thus
fulfilled the traditional criteria of a government, the international
community did not recognize the junta as the government of Haiti.
398. See Goldman, supra note 34, at 3.
399. See Wippman, supra note 387, at 212-13 (confirming general state policy
that aiding rebel forces or the government violates the non-intervention principle).
400. See Roth, supra note 349, at 483 (highlighting the strengthening of international human rights norms and the spirit of cooperation as reasons for the changing
climate).
401. See Edward Collins, Jr. & Timothy M. Cole, Regime Legitimation in Instances of Coup-CausedGovernment-In-Exile: The Cases of Presidents Makarios
and Aristide, 5 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 199, 238 (1996); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The
Global Process of Legitimation and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 14
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 140 (1997).
402. See Collins & Cole, supra note 401, at 219 (citing President Aristide's failure to disavow mob violence as one of the reasons for his eventual overthrow).
403. See, e.g., Domingo E. Acevedo, The Haitian Crisisand the AS Response:
A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy. in ENFORCING RESTRAINTCOLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 119. 132 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch ed., 1993) (discussing the reactions of the international community);
SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION-THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN
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The United Nations and the OAS continued to regard Aristide as the
legitimate head of state, labeled the military junta as an "illegal de
facto regime, ' 4° and repeatedly demanded the democratically elected
President's return to power. 401
Burundi represents the next notable case in what may be the beginning of a paradigmatic shift in the concept of government legitimacy. 406 The Secretary-General and the Security Council strongly condemned the violent overthrow of the democratically elected
government by a military coup d'etat in July 1996.407 Furthermore, Bu-

rundi's neighbors in the Lake region of East Africa immediately announced a total trade embargo against the country. Under the pressure of the embargo and the Security Council, the military junta was
eventually forced to restore the Parliament. 9
In Sierra Leone, the military junta faced the same hostile reaction
from the international community. No state recognized the junta as

EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 260 (1996). For discussion concerning the effect of

collective legitimization of governments through in particular the United Nations,
see David D. Caron, Governance and Collective Legitimization in the New World
Order, 6 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 29 (1993); Inis Claude, Jr., Collective Legitimization as a PoliticalFunction of the United Nations, 20 INT'L ORG. 367 (1966).
404. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
405. See id. For discussion concerning the reaction of the OAS, see Supportfor
the Democratic Government of Haiti, MRE/RES. 1, Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, OEA/ser.F/V. 1 (1991).
406. See generally James C. McKinsley, Jr., As the West Hesitates on Burundi,
Leaders in Africa Make a Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at AI (providing an
overview of the situation in Africa).
407. See U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3682d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1996/31
(1996) (articulating support for President Nyere); see also U.N. SCOR, 51 st Sess.,
3695th mtg. at I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1072 (1996) (condemning "the overthrow of
the legitimate government and constitutional order in Burundi"); see also Donald
G. McNeil, Jr., Burundi Army Stages Coup, and New Fighting is Feared, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1996, at A3; see generally Patricia Y. Reyhan, Genocidal Violence
in Burundi: Should InternationalLaw Prohibit Domestic HumanitarianIntervention?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 771 (1997).
408. See James C. McKinsley, Jr., As the West Hesitates on Burundi, Leaders in
Africa Make a Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at Al. The countries in question
were Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zaire. See Reyhan, supra note 407,

at 772.
409. James C. McKinsley, Jr., East African Countries Keep Burundi Sanctions
in Place, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13. 1996, at A12.
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the legitimate government of Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the United
Nations, as well as regional organizations, strongly condemned the
coup d'etat as illegal under international law and demanded the return of the democratically elected government.
The international community's reaction following the coup in Sierra
Leone thus demonstrates that Haiti can no longer be considered an exceptional case under unique circumstances,"" but rather it is considered the beginning of a change in the international legal doctrine of
governmental legitimacy. State practice in Sierra Leone, Haiti, and
other cases of states and international organizations condemning military coups against democratic governments, suggests a tentative rejection of the "effective control" doctrine.4 " This is further evidenced by
the fact that since the end of the Cold War states have adopted declarations obliging them to intervene on behalf of democratic governments which are in danger of being overthrown by coup d'etats.1 Examples of such documents are the Santiago Commitment to
Democracy, adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS in June
199 , 41' and the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co410. See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 2,U.N. Doc. SIRES1940 (1994)
(stating that the Security Council "recognizes the unique character of the present
situation in Haiti .... ."). The unique circumstances were also stressed by international legal scholars. See Douglas Lee Donoho. Evolution or £-rpediency: The
United Nations Response to the Disruption of Democracy, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
329, 376 (1996); Wippman, supra note 191, at 677.
411. See Acevedo, supra note 403, at 141. But see Wippman, supra note 366, at
219 (noting that the United Nations has only authorized military intervention
against a sitting government in Haiti). Haiti was a unique case because the U.N.
authorized intervention was directed against a government that had overthrown a
democratically elected government, and was supported by both the United States
and the de jure government itself. See id. Neither of these circumstances are likely
to be repeated in any other nation in the near future. See id.
412. For discussion on the legal implications of international treaties authorizing
external interventions in cases of the violent overthrow of a government, see David
Wippman, Treaty-BasedIntervention: Whlio Can SaY No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 607
(1995).
413. See Domingo E. Acevedo & Claudio Grossman, The Organization of
American States and the Protection of Democracy in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTYCOLLECTIVELY DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS 132, 137 (Tom Farer
ed., 1996); Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to
Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and
Guatemala, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 393 (1994).

394

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[14:321

operation in Europe ("CSCE" recently renamed "OSCE") in June
1990.414 An argument can be made, albeit cautiously, that at least in the
case of the violent overthrow of a sitting, democratically elected government, the criterion of "effective control" no longer serves as the decisive factor in determining the legitimacy of a government.1 5
The doctrine of legitimacy in determining the lawfulness of a government is not new in the history of international law. It is found in the
writings of early international legal scholars such as Hugo Grotius,
and only with Vattel did the contrary doctrine of de facto control take
hold in legal literature. "t6 The doctrine of legitimacy holds that the legality of every government rests not upon mere de facto control of the
state, but upon compliance with the established legal order of that
country." Historically, however, the doctrine is not connected with
democratic governance, but rather stressed the notion of dynastic legitimization. Not surprisingly, the doctrine was most popular in the
end of the eighteenth and into the nineteenth centuries as a reaction of
the principle European Monarchs, later united in the Holy Alliance,
towards the French Revolution of 1789.48 The doctrine of legitimacy
in the form of democratic constitutionalism only applied to state practice at the beginning of the twentieth century in the foreign policy of
the United States and the states of Central America. During this time
the doctrine was embodied in the Tobar doctrine as well as the policies
of President Wilson.4 9 These developments, although noteworthy, had
limited global impact and remained restricted to the area of the above
mentioned states. Even within that limited geographical area, some
states rejected the doctrine, favoring de facto considerations when rec414. See 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990). See generally Halberstam, supra note 99, at
163.
415. See Collins & Cole, supra note 401, at 238.
416. For a historical overview on this subject, see JULIUS
15 (1915).

GOEBEL,

THE

RECOGNITION POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

417. See CHEN, supra note 389, at 105.
418. See ROLAND HALL SHARP, NONRECOGNITION AS A LEGAL OBLIGATION 13
(1934); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty and Intervention, in BEYOND
WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 228, 243
(Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995); CHEN, supra note 389, at
105.
419. See JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 88, at 152; TESON, supra note 9, at 82;
SHARP, supra note 418, at 34.
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ognizing new governments. '2 Particularly during the Cold War period,
the criterion of effective control was generally applied for the reasons
outlined above. The ideological confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union, accompanied by contradictory understandings of the legitimacy of a government in general and the meaning of democracy in particular, would have rendered attempts to determine the lawfulness of a government by general normative criteria
based on popular sovereignty impossible. Despite the frequency of
foreign interventions during this period, based on a variety of justifications ,' the criterion of effective control must be seen as a legal

means to prevent the internationalization of internal conflicts through
interventions, which always entailed the danger of a large scale confrontation between the two main antagonists.
Even during the Cold War, however, the doctrine of effective control was not consistently applied. In South Africa, for example, the
apartheid government clearly possessed effective control over the territory, but was denied credentials in the United Nations General Assembly because "the South African regime has no right to represent
the people of South Africa."'-'
Haiti and Sierra Leone demonstrate that in the post-Cold War era,
practical considerations that supported a reliance on the effective control doctrine have lost most of their factual basis. ':2 Although considerable ideological differences obstruct a universal understanding and
uniform application of the concept of democracy' 2 and other international legal norms,'2 the international community's reaction to the
420. See Philip C. Jessup, The EstradaDoctrine, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 719 (1931);

also SHARP, supra note 418, at 61-62.
421. For an overview of the justifications for numerous foreign interventions in
Africa, see Wippman, supra note 366, at 444.
422. G.A. Res. 3151(G), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 35, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973); see TES6N, supra note 9. at 86; Roth, supra note 349, at 498.
423. See Perez, supra note 154, at 440.
424. See Anne Orford, Locating the International:Militar and Monetar' Interventions after the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 460 et seq. (1997); see also
Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 601
(1996); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Concept of Legitimate Governance in the
Contemporaty International Legal Systen, 44 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 33, 48-49
(1997).
425. For an overview of the recent discussion concerning the relativity of human
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coups in Haiti and Sierra Leone indicate there are now "clear cases"
where the lawfulness of a government is measured by its democratic
legitimatization rather than its effective control in the form of brutal
oppression.426
In view of these recent changes in the concept of government legitimacy, one may conclude that, despite his loss of control over the
state territory, but in accordance with the reaction of the international
community, President Kabbah remained the legitimate and thus lawful government of Sierra Leone after the coup. His request for outside military assistance was therefore a legitimate request for assistance from a head of state.
d. Was President Kabbah Entitled to Ask for Foreign Military Assistance?
Because President Kabbah remained the lawful government of Sierra Leone in exile, it would seem obvious that he maintained the right
to ask for military assistance from other states to restore government.
His request was not void under international law simply because he
was in exile and no longer the head of an "effective government." Restrictions on asking for outside assistance, in cases of widespread conflict, placed on governments by the "effective control" doctrine do not
apply to democratically elected governments overthrown by an illegal
coup d'6tat.427 Rather they are a logical consequence of the traditional
doctrine measuring the "legitimacy" or lawfulness of a government in
accordance with its ability to control effectively the country on its
own. In contrast to that view, a democratically elected government is
legitimized on a normative basis and neither gains nor loses this legitimacy through effective territorial control or lack thereof.
This consequence seems logically derived from the concept of intervention by invitation as viewed together with the new doctrine of
governmental legitimacy, which admittedly does not necessarily make

rights, see Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29
COLUM HUM. RTs. REv. 1 (1997); Stephen J. Toope, Cultural Diversity and Hitman Rights, 42 MCGILL L.J. 169 (1997).
426. See Roth, supra note 349, at 513 (discussing the conditions in Haiti).
427. Cf id. at 511 (stating that before the intervention in Haiti occurred, "in all
likelihood, fulfillment of request for armed assistance would not in this case be
deemed a violation of international law").
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it a rule of international law. 4'2 There are suggestions, however, that
the Haitian precedent indicates that in the absence of authorization by
the Security Council, consent of the legitimate government alone does
not give a right of pro-democratic intervention. ': Although the Security Council took note of President Aristide's consent expressed in two
letters,' 30 the Council relied mainly on its authority to maintain international peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter in authorizing military intervention in Haiti. It has been stated
that the Security Council was "evidently unwilling to treat that consent
as sufficient in and of itself to permit military action.""
Merely because the Security Council considered the situation in
Haiti a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of
the United Nations Charter and relied on its powers under Chapter VII
of the Charter to authorize the use of force, however, does not mean
that Haiti serves as a precedent against the existence of a right of prodemocratic intervention based on the consent of the legitimate government. When authorizing military intervention by Member States
involving the use of force, Article 24(2) requires the Security Council
to act in accordance with the specific powers granted to this organ under the Charter.432 The Security Council may only authorize coercive
military sanctions under Article 42 in connection with Article 48."'"

428. This is demonstrated by the fact that although under international law, "any
breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparations .... ." See
Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w (Germ. %.Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13). It is highly disputed and, in the light of the practice of
states, doubtful whether this is also true for state obligations under international
environmental law. See Oscar Schachter, The Greening of InternationalLaw. in
MELANGES RENE-JEAN DUPUY 272 (1991).
429. See Wippman, supra note 366, at 473.
430. See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Supp., July 30, 1994, at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/910 (1994) (consenting to agreement of draft Resolution S/1994/04).
431. Wippman, supra note 387, at 218.
432. "In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in
Chapters VI, VII, VIII, XII." U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 2.
433. There is some debate among international legal scholars concerning the
specific legal basis for the authorization of military enforcement actions by member states in the absence of special agreements under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. However, the apparently prevailing view considers authorizations of
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Or, in the case of enforcement actions by regional arrangements, the
Security Council may authorize military sanctions under Article 53 of
the Charter.434 Both methods require a determination by the Council
under Article 39 that a threat to international peace and security exists. 35 Thus, the Security Council cannot authorize an enforcement action based solely on the consent of a state.4 6 The Security Council
must act in accordance with the powers conferred under the United
Nations Charter. It follows that the Security Council, by basing its
authorization on Chapter VII of the Charter, did not demonstrate re-

the use of force like Resolution 678 (1990) in connection with the Iraqi Invasion of
Kuwait as being based on Article 42 in connection with Article 48 of the United
Nations Charter. See Jost Delbriick, The Impact of the Allocation of International
Law Enforcement Authority on the InternationalLegal Order, in ALLOCATION OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 135, 153 (Jost

Delbriick ed., 1995) (arguing that when the Security Council called on United Nations members to carry out a decision under Articles 42 and 48, it is binding on the
members); Christopher J. Sabec, The Security Council Comes of Age: An Analysis
of the InternationalLegal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 21 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 63, 100 (1991) (stating that a unified armed force under the Security Council command is not necessary to the exercise of Article 42); T.D. Gill,
Legal and Some PoliticalLimitations on the Power of the U.N. Security Council to
Exercise its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 26 NETII.
Y.B. INT'L L. 33, 58 (1995) (arguing that Article 52 authorizes deployment of
troops and military action).
434. See Ress, supra note 204, at 733.
435. For a discussion concerning the requirement of a determination under Article 39 prior to the adoption of measures under Article 42 United Nations Charter,
see Frowein, supra note 216, at 631; SHAW, supra note 88, at 855. For a discussion
of measures under Article 53, see Ress, supra note 204, at 733.
436. This is the difference between enforcement actions, also called "peacemaking" operations, under Chapter VII or VIII of the United Nations Charter and
the traditional peace-keeping, or "Blue Helmet" operations, which are based primarily on the consent of all the parties to the conflict. See, e.g., Michael Bothe,
Peace-Keeping, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY
565, 573 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994); Perez, supra note 154, at 413. In the
situation of Haiti, the deployment of "Blue Helmets" would not have been possible
due to the lack of consent on the side of the military junta. Thus, the possible necessity to use military means to restore democracy in Haiti, which distinguished
this situation from classical peace-keeping operations, was also the reason why the
Secretary General in his report on the United Nations mission in Haiti advised the
Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the Charter. See Report of the Secretaiy-Generalon the United Nations Mission in Haiti, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. at 6,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/828.
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luctance to treat Aristide's consent as sufficient to permit military action, but acted in accordance with its Charter powers.
Furthermore, President Aristide's appeal for assistance was not addressed to individual states or a regional organization as in the case of
Sierra Leone, but was exclusively directed to the United Nations.!" In
response, the United Nations activated the mechanisms for authorizing
military interventions as prescribed in the Charter."" The argument
that Aristide's consent was not a necessary prerequisite for the adoption of Resolution 940 does not contradict the foregoing argument.' "
This merely supports the fact that under Chapter VII, the Security
Council has the power to adopt economic and military sanctions without the consent of the parties to the dispute in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. This does not, however, foreclose on the possibility that a foreign military intervention can be
independently based on two legal justifications, namely, an authorization by the Security Council and the consent of the legitimate government of a state.9
Because the Security Council authorized intervention in Haiti, the
Haitian intervention does not represent a strong precedent for the existence of a right of pro-democratic intervention by regional organizations or individual states based solely on the consent of the legitimate
government. It does, however, lead to the conclusion that Haiti cannot
be invoked as evidence of the unlawfulness of such interventions to
restore democracy.

437. See Letter to the Secretary-Generalof July 29, 1994, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., Supp., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1994/905 (1994) ("Therefore, I feel that the time
has come for the international community ... to take prompt and effective action,
under the authorityof the United Nations .... ") (emphasis added).
438. Several international legal scholars have pointed out the possible significance of Aristide's request to the United Nations for the actions taken by the Security Council. See Richard B. Lillich, The Role of the U.N. Securiri"Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: U.N. HumanitarianIntervention in the
Post Cold War World, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 1, 10 n.45 (1995) (noting Aristide's agreement with the text of Resolution 940); Perez, supra note 154, at 431
(stating that the Security Council found the support of Aristide's United Nations
representative critical); Tomuschat, supra note 200, at 340 (noting the Security
Council's finding of unique circumstances in Haiti, including the support of the
legitimate government for United Nations action).
439. See TES6N, supra note 9, at 256.
440. See id.
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Furthermore, the fact that invitation by a democratically elected
government was invoked as a justification in previous interventions
such as Panama,"' but was overwhelmingly rejected by the international community, does not necessarily speak against the validity of
President Kabbah's request as a legal basis for ECOMOG intervention. First, in contrast to the situation of Panama, the present case of
Sierra Leone, like Haiti, concerns a sitting, democratically elected
government that was recognized by virtually all other states before
the coup d'etat."2 The international community's unanimous condemnation of coups against sitting democratic governments in the recent post-Cold War cases and the welcoming of their restoration to
power through military interventions clearly demonstrate that a
democratically elected government, even if temporarily forced into
exile, has the right to request foreign militaryassistance."
Second, the fact that the ECOMOG action in Sierra Leone was undertaken under the authority of ECOWAS as a regional organization
and with the approval of other regional actors like the OAU further
strengthens the legitimacy of the military intervention. The collective
character, at least on a regional level, of the intervention provides a
higher degree of impartiality and prevents, at least to a certain degree,
abuses of the right to intervene." 4 Although Nigeria, the most powerful country in West Africa, played the dominant role this action, as did
the United States in Haiti, this does not deprive the action of its collective and thus more acceptable character. This demonstrates that in

441. See Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of
Senate on United States Military Action in Panama, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1985 (Dec. 25, 1989) (claiming the United States action is welcomed by the
democratically elected government of Panama); see also Henkin, supra note 263,
at 299.
442. See SHAW, supra note 88, at 800 (arguing that the democratically elected
government of Panama never exercised any authority over the country).
443. See Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in InternationalLaw of Heads of
States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES COURS 9,
86-87 (1994 III) (stating that an exiled head of state may represent his own state
and call for foreign military assistance to restore lawful government).
444. See Tom Farer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING
RESTRAINT-COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 316, 331 (Lore

Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993); see also Edward Kwakwa, Internal Conflict in Africa:
Is There A Right of HumanitarianAction?, 2 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 42 (1994);
Nolte, supra note 74, at 624.
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the absence of a standing military force under the command of the
United Nations" ' "military intervention usually requires the lead of a
committed and powerful state, one that is willing to invest the necessary resources and to stay long enough to accomplish the goals of intervention."" 6
In an international system still predominantly characterized by a decentralized enforcement of international law through individual
states447 the most notable obstacle to successful interventions is the difficulty in generating necessary resources and political will." Military
actions will often only take place if the interests of a major world or
regional power are at stake. As a consequence, military interventions
to restore democracy and to protect human rights will remain selective
and depend on political considerations of the major powers.'"'
This fact does not deprive foreign military interventions based on
the consent of the democratically elected government-in-exile of their
legality under international law. Thus, the ECOWAS intervention in
Sierra Leone can be regarded as a lawful exercise of the use of force in

445. For a discussion concerning a standing United Nations army, see Shibley
Telhami, Is a Standing United Nations Arn " Possible? Or Desirable?, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 673 (1995). See also Laurence 1. Rothstein, Protecting the
New World Order: It is Time to Create a United Nations Army, 14 N.Y. L. ScH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 107 (1993).
446. Wippman, supra note 191, at 682.
447. See JESSUP, supra note 95, at 17; see also Torsten Stein, DecentralizedInternationalLaw Enforcement: The ChangingRole of the State as Law Enjbrcemnent
Agent, in ALLOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 107, 126 (Jost Delbrfic ed., 1995) (concluding that states
enjoy a wide degree of freedom whether to engage in international law enforcement). In contemporary international law, however, there are developments towards a more centralized concept of enforcement. See Jost Delbrueck, A More Effective International Law or a New "1World Law"?-Sone Aspects of the
Development of InternationalLaw in a Changing International System, 68 IND.
L.J. 705, 720 et seq. (1993) (discussing the decentralization of law enforcement
authority in international law); JENNINGS & WATTS. supra note 88, at 11 (labeling
international law as an imperfect order).
448. See Wippman, supra note 191, at 681.
449. See generally Stanley Hoffmann, The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,98
FOREIGN POL'Y 159, 172 (1995); John C. Pierce, The Haitian Crisis and the Fitture of Collective Enforcement of Democratic Governance, 27 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 477, 511 (1996); Lea Brilmayer. What's the Matter With Selective Intervention?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 955 (1995).
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light of the changing concept of government legitimacy and the resulting modified doctrine of intervention by invitation under contemporary international law.
5. The Conarky Agreement
A final issue that must be addressed in evaluating the legality of
the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone is the effect of the Conakry Agreement, which set forth a peace plan for Sierra Leone. When
Nigerian troops ousted the Koromah junta in February 1998, the
Conakry Agreement of October 1997 was still in force. The Agreement set out a six-month timetable for a return to democracy in Sierra Leone. The reinstatement of Kabbah's government by April
1998 would mark the culmination of the transition back to democracy. The Nigerian military intervention cut short the timetable
agreed to by the parties to the Conakry Agreement. Although the Nigerian actions facilitated Kabbah's reinstatement and are thus consistent with the broadest goals of the Conakry Agreement, the means
employed to achieve this end are clearly at odds with the Agreement's vision of a cooperative, negotiated transition. Nigeria's disregard for the express provisions of the Conakry Agreement, to which
ECOWAS was a party, again calls into question the legality of its
actions.
In reality, if not on paper, the Conakry Agreement was breached
long before the Nigerian intervention. The Agreement rested on the
achievement of six goals within six months: the reinstatement of the
legitimate government of President Tejan Kabbah; the immediate
cessation of hostilities; cooperation of the junta with ECOMOG to
peacefully impose sanctions; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants; provisions of humanitarian assistance;
return of refugees and displaced persons; immunities and guarantees
to the leaders of the May 25, 1997 coup; and modalities for broadening the power base in Sierra Leone." 0 The immediate cessation of
hostilities and the disarmament of troops never materialized, thus

450. See Letter Dated 28 October 1997 From the Permanent Representative of
Nigeria to the United Nations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., Annex 1, at para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/1997/824 (1997) (describing the ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone contained in the Communique
issued at Conakry on October 23, 1997).
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crippling the Agreement almost from birth.4 " Within six weeks of the
signing of the Conakry Agreement, the United Nations SecretaryGeneral reported renewed military activity around the country. 2The
junta forces, primarily the RUF, continued to engage in heavy fighting against the Kamajors in the southeast of the country, particularly
around diamond-producing areas.'" Junta forces were reported recruiting, training, and arming new combatants.' 4 In February 1998,
five days before the Nigerians ousted Koromah, the United Nations
Secretary-General reported on the situation in Sierra Leone, again recording the continued warring throughout the country." The report
notes that Koromah acknowledged to the United Nations Special Envoy that the Conakry Agreement was not being implemented.''
Although the Conakry Agreement on its face bound the parties,
including ECOWAS, to an agreed timeline for the transition back to
Kabbah's government, the junta breached the agreement from the
beginning. The Conakry Agreement was treated as little more than a
formality to be ignored by the all the factions, including the junta,
RUF forces, the Kamajors, and the Civil Defense Unit ("CDU"). If
the Agreement was not stillborn, it certainly died before it ever left
the nursery. The Conakry Agreement in and of itself did not represent a prohibition against the Nigerian intervention.

IV. THE USE OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN
AFRICA
The ECOWAS action in Sierra Leone is illustrative of the organization's increasingly powerful position in West Africa. As noted

451. See Second Report of the Secretar General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, supra note 41, para. 14.
452. See id. para. 16 (describing fighting in Sierra Leone despite the supposed
ceasefire between ECOMOG and junta troops).
453. See id. (noting the failure ofjunta forces to adhere to the ceasefire).
454. See id. (explaining junta efforts to strengthen its forces).
455. See Third Report of the Secretar"-Generalon the Situation on Sierra Leone, supra note 46, para. 10 (describing the security situation in the countryside as
highly volatile).
456. See id. Koromah listed the "dominant role played by the Nigerian contingent in ECOMOG" as one of the primary reasons why the junta failed to fully adhere to the terms of the Conakry Agreement. See id.
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above, ECOWAS played a crucial role in the Liberian civil war,
from the early days of the war through the monitoring of the postwar elections in July 1997.457 Although ECOWAS was originally
created by the community of West African states as an economic organization,458 the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone suggest
that ECOWAS's self-assigned function is evolving not only toward
regional peacekeeping, but to regional peace-creator.4 ' 9 A review of
the ECOWAS actions in Liberia and Sierra Leone forces one to ask
whether the development of regional organizations such as
ECOWAS is something that the international community should embrace and encourage, or whether these developments should be
treated with caution and skepticism. To answer this question it is important to understand how regional organizations function within in
the United Nations.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter addresses the issue of
regional organizations. Article 52(1) provides that "[n]othing in the
present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements for
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent
with the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations."4 0 Article
53(1) supports the right of these regional organizations to exist with
the United Nations framework by allowing the Security Council, to
use such arrangements or agencies for its enforcement actions.4 6" Ar-

457. See Howe, supra note 69, at 146; see also Statement by the President of the
Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/1997/41 (1997) (commending ECOMOG for
its contribution to the holding of elections in Liberia).
458. See Kannyo, supra note 207, at 60; Ofodile, supra note 168, at 410.
459. See Tran & McElroy, supra note 24.
460. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
461.

See U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para 1. The text reads:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement actions under its authority. But no enforcement action shall
be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against an enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2

1998]

MILITARY INTER VENTION IN SIERRA LEONE

405

ticle 53, however, clearly prohibits regional actions without the consent of the Security Council. Regional organizations are thus recognized and accepted as legitimate actors in the Charter, but are denied
any right of action independent of Security Council authorizations.
Some commentators note that the United Nations Charter fails to
define the relationship between regional organizations and the United
Nations.6 This ambiguity is likely the result of disagreement between states during the initial negotiations and deliberations leading
up the to the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization ("San Francisco Conference"), which resulted in the final
United Nations Charter.6' The disagreement among states at the San
Francisco Conference is best illustrated in the conflicting vision of
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull. While Churchill believed that primary responsibility for maintenance of the post-war order should rest with
regional councils under the leadership of regional powers, Hull advocated the maintenance of peace by strong centralized global organization.64 The result is the disagreement found in the United Nations Charter, which both recognizes regional organizations and
provides for the supremacy of the Security Council.
of the Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such
time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged
with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
Id. Paragraph 2 defines enemy state as a state that during was an enemy of the signatory state in question during World War II. See U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 2.
462. See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations. Regional Organizations, and Military Operations: The Past and Present, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & IN'L
L. 3, 18 (1996) (stating that rather than unambiguously defining the relationship
between regional arrangements and the United Nations, the United Nations Charter
provided language that satisfied all of the parties in 1945); Bjorn Hettne, The
United Nations and Conflict Management: The Role of the "'NewRegionalism," 4
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 643, 652 (1994) (noting that the role of regions is only vaguely acknowledged in the United Nations Charter).
463. See Arend, supra note 462, at 5; Christopher J. Borgen, Note, The Theory
and Practiceof Regional OrganizationsIntervention in Civil Wars, 26 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 797, 798 (1994) (stating that there were debates concerning the
relationship between global and regional arrangements at the San Francisco conference).
464. For a detailed analysis of this debate, see Inis L. Claude, The OAS the
U.N., and the United States, 547 INT'L COUNCILIATION 3 (1964).
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The tension between regionalism and globalism embodied in
Chapter VIII has led, on occasion, to jurisdictional tensions between
the United Nations and regional organizations. 465 Following the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, for example, the Security Council issued a series of resolutions condemning the invasions and imposing harsh economic sanctions.466 The Arab League's representative to the United Nations, Clovis Maksoud, criticized the
international community for failing to first take the issue to the Arab
League, the relevant regional organization. 47 Although the United
Nations Charter did not require that the Arab League consider the
problem before it reached United Nations consideration, the Arab
League's criticism indicates the degree of confusion surrounding the
issue of regional organizations within the United Nations. A variation of the jurisdictional problem also arose in the Balkans, where the
possible jurisdiction of the United Nations, NATO, the European
Community, and the West European Union led the various organizations to inaction while each deferred to another.4 6 Thus there may be
no clear consensus between Member States of the United Nations
and regional organizations concerning the appropriate forum to address regional disputes.
B. THE CONTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO PEACE
AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

In a recent report entitled "The Causes of Conflict and Promotion
of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa," United
Nation Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the contributions
that regional and sub-regional organizations can make to peace in

465. See Alan K. Henrikson, The United Nations and Regional Organizations:
"King-Links" of a "Global Chain ", 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35, 44 (1996)

(citing the vagueness of the responsibility between the global organization and regional groupings).
466. See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 1,U.N. Doc.
S/RES/660 (1990) (condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait); S.C. Res. 661, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. paras. 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990) (imposing
diplomatic and economic sanctions on Iraq).
467. See Arend, supra note 462, at 19 (stating that Clovis Maksoud believed the
Arab League should have attempted to resolve the dispute between Kuwait and
Iraq before the United Nations took action).
468. See id. at 20.
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Africa. 469 Highlighting the need for regional and subregional initiatives to operate within the context of the United Nations, Annan
noted that support to regional organizations is necessary and desirable for matters of international peace and security.4' In particular,
he notes the United Nations' overall lack of "capacity, resources, and
expertise" to deal with the sundry problems arising on the African
continent.4' The report finds that strengthening Africa's capacity for
peacekeeping must be a key priority for United Nations and supports
a proposal for training and material assistance for regional
peacekeeping in Africa.472 Annan concludes his discussion of regional initiatives with a call for increased cooperation between the
United Nations and the OAU, as well as strongly encouraging all
Member States to contribute to United Nations and OAU trust funds
established to improve preparedness for conflict prevention and
peacekeeping in Afica.47 ' The position of the Secretary-General is
clear: the future of peace and security in Africa is at least partially
dependent on the operation of regional organizations with the capacity and expertise to resolve conflict and maintain peace in their region.
Many international legal scholars agree that the growth in regional
organizations represents a net gain to the international community,
particularly when intervening in internal conflicts or civil wars."'
469. See The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and SustainableDevelopment in Africa, supra note 1, paras. 41-45 (1998).
470. See id. para. 41 (stating that the international community should -'stnve to
complement rather supplant African efforts to solve Africa's problems").
471. Id.
472. See id. para. 45 (suggesting these peacekeeping missions can take place in
the framework of a United Nations peacekeeping mission or one conducted by a
regional organization).
473. See id. (emphasizing that these efforts are not in any way intended to relieve the international community of its obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations).
474. See Richard Falk, Regionalism and World Order after the Cold War, ST.
LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 71, 73 (1995); see also Captain Davis
Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F.L.
REv. 235, 236 (1997) (observing that regional organizations have begun to assert a
new role in collective security by stopping civil wars and enabling combatants to
achieve peace); Hettne, supra note 462, at 647; GARETH EVANS, COOPERA.TING
FOR PEACE: THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR THE 1990S AND BEYOND 41 (1993) (noting

408

AM. U. INT' L. RE V.

[14:321

Potential benefits of regional organizations include military and political advantages, including familiarity with the conflict and a strong
commitment to and interest in regional peace. Furthermore, as the
Secretary-General of the United Nations notes in his report, the use
of regional organization in military conflicts may strengthen the institutional capacity of the regional actors to mediate regional crises.4
The use of regional forces may also, however, create problems in
Africa. Although Annan points to the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia as illustrative of the potential for successful regional operations, it may be disputed whether that initiative was indeed a success.
Regional forces tend to reflect existing political tensions in the region. In Africa, a continent of fifty-two countries and hundreds of
ethnic groups that cross boarders, regional organizations may reflect
the divisions in the countries from which they draw their membership. Some observers note that the ECOMOG action in Liberia may
have aggravated tensions in the civil war for this reason.7 Serious
Anglophone-Francophone divisions occurring within ECOMOG
were reported during the Liberia action.7 For example, as Anglophone countries pushed a major offensive against a rebel group in
Liberia, Francophone countries resisted increased ECOMOG involvement. 7
Furthermore, particular states may have a vested interest in capturing power in the regional organization. Since 1990, only Nigerians
have commanded ECOMOG.47 9 This has lead to a situation in which
ECOMOG is equated with Nigeria, and its credibility tied to Nigerian credibility. °
that international legal regimes can offer security benefits to the international
community, in addition to the parties in general).
475. See The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and SustainableDevelopment in Africa, supra note 1, para. 41.
476. See Howe, supra note 69, at 161; see also, Binaifer Nowrojee, Joining
Forces: United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping-Lessonsfrom Liberia, 8
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 129, 137 (1995) (explaining that peacekeepers have helped
prolong the conflict).
477. See Howe, supra note 69, at 161.
478.
479.
480.
1997,

See id.
See id.
See A. Bolaji Akinyemi, End the Military Meddling, GUARDIAN, June 5,
at 21.
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Finally, the existence of regional organizations within the framework of the United Nations carries with it the risk that the regional
organization will ignore its place in the international system and act
without the Security Council's approval. It is precisely this dynamic
that has occurred in West Africa, first in the case of Liberia and
again in Sierra Leone. As noted above, ECOWAS may rightfully be
regarded as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the United
Nations Charter. 48 ' The Security Council itself confirmed this interpretation when it evoked Chapter VIII of the Charter to authorize
ECOWAS to enforce sanctions against Sierra Leone.4 " Under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, ECOWAS action in Sierra
Leone required authorization by the Security Council that was absent
at the time of the action. Although the ultimate result of the
ECOWAS action in Sierra Leone may be applauded, the long-term
stability of the international legal system requires regional organizations to act within the framework set out in Chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter.
With the end of the Cold War, Africa no longer attracts the attention of superpowers seeking to influence regional politics." While
the United States once rushed to the aid of pro-democratic movements in countries such as Angola and Mozambique, the end of a bipolar international system has led to a loss of urgency in the international community's approach to Africa. When Burundi imploded in
1996 and the United Nations called upon sixty non-African countries
to form a standby peacekeeping force, only one state, Bangladesh,
agreed.4 As the failure of the international community to react to the
genocide in Rwanda indicates, Africa can not rely on the international community to provide forces when necessary to support peace
and political stability. For this reason it is necessary that African

481. See supra notes 203-11 and accompanying text (analyzing whether
ECOWAS is a United Nations Article VIII organization).
482. See S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 37, para. 8.
483. See A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of the United Nations Securin"Council in
African Peace Management: Some Proposals, 17 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 537, 539
(1996) (explaining that the Security Council is likely to take a greater peace management role in Africa, as superpowers continue to lose interest in Africa).
484. See Howe, supra note 69, at 163.
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states develop organizations with the capacity to intervene when
authorized by the Security Council.

CONCLUSION
The international community's increasing acceptance of the use of
force to restore democratically elected governments overthrown by
coup d'etats does not necessarily mean that such actions will prove
successful in the long run. Even a democratically elected government
cannot be successful if it is permanently dependent on a foreign
military power to guarantee its security. Democracy must be the
autochthonous expression of the political will of a country's populace to survive. 485 In newly democratic states confronted with serious
economic problems and the heritage of a long civil war, democracy
will often prevail only if the international community-most critically the United N aons 8-supports the evolution from a fragile
peace to stable and prosperous democracy. In Sierra Leone, the restoration of the democratically elected government may be regarded as a
first step in this evolution process. To take root, this first step must be
followed by the development of a civil society comprising democratic
values. Sadly, recent outbreaks of renewed fighting in Sierra Leone
suggest that the country will continue to struggle in its transformation
to a full democracy. Ultimately this transformation may require the assistance of the international community of states.

485. See E.K. Quashigah, Legitimacy of Governments and the Resolution of InIra-National Conflicts in Africa, 7 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 284, 296 (1995) (addressing specifically the situation in Africa); Gwendolyn Mikell, Ethnic Particelarism and the Creation of State Legitimacy in West Africa, 4 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 99 (1996); see generally Nicholas 0. Berry, The Conflict Between United
States Intervention and Promoting Democracy in the Third World, 60 TEMP. L.Q.
1015 (1987) (explaining that the United States must not dominate democracy in the
Third World-a democracy must be under the domination of its own people).
486. On the role of the United Nations in the Promotion and Assistance of Democratization, see Agenda for Democratization: Report by the UN SecretaryGeneral of December 20, 1996, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 41, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/51/761 (1996) (defining the role of the United Nations in the promotion and assistance of the process of democratization). See also Ibrahim J. Gassama, Safeguardingthe Democratic Entitlement: A Proposalfor United Nations Involvement
in National Politics,30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287 (1997) (declaring that the United
Nations has begun to develop a tenuous consensus on its new role in legitimizing
governance in the Third World).
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It is ironic that in the case of Sierra Leone a democratically elected
government was restored primarily through the efforts of one of Africa's most notorious military regimes. Nigeria's struggles with repressive governance have long occupied the United Nations. In November 1995, following the hanging of nine Nigerian human rights
activists, the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the
arbitrary executions and expressing deep concern about the human
rights situation in the country. "s In 1996, the Commission on Human
Rights noted the continuing deterioration of the human rights situation in Nigeria and called upon the military government of General
Sani Abacha to ensure observance of human rights, specifically by
restoring habeas corpus; by releasing all political prisoners, trade
unionists, human rights advocates, and journalists in detention; by
guaranteeing freedom of the press; and by insuring the respect for the
rights of all people, particularly members of minorities. ' In 1997,
the United Nations General Assembly again expressed concern about
the on-going human rights violations in Nigeria. ' Clearly the military regime had everything to gain and nothing to lose by intervening
in the affairs of its West African neighbors. The intervention in Sierra Leone provided Nigeria with the opportunity to redeem its own
failings in the eyes of the international community, allowed it to gain
a foothold in a country with significant diamond reserves, and provided an excuse to keep its own potentially menacing military engaged abroad.
Given the international community's increasing acceptance of prodemocratic interventions and the promising role of regional organizations in carrying out those interventions, it cannot escape notice
that the Nigerian government, ECOWAS's greatest supporter, nullified the results of that country's democratic elections in 1993."3
487. See Situation of Human Rights in Nigeria. U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda
Item 112(c), at paras. 2 & 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/501199 (1996) (suggesting that the
absence of representative government in Nigeria led to human rights violations).
488. See U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 57th Sess., 1499th mtg. at 4-6, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65 (1996).
489. See Human Rights Questions: Report of the Third Committee, U.N. GAOR,
52d. Sess., Agenda Item 112, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/5216441Add. 3 (1997) (describing
the on-going problem of human rights violations in Nigeria).
490. See AMNESTY INT'L, NIGERIA: TIME TO END CONTEMPT FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, DOC. No. AFR44/14/96, Nov. 6, 1996, at I.
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While the international community welcomes the ECOWAS action
in restoring democracy to Sierra Leone, the ultimate challenge for
ECOWAS may be to facilitate the peaceful transition to democracy
in Nigeria. Recent developments in Nigeria signal tentative movement toward such a transition. Following the death of General Sani
Abacha, Nigeria's new leader, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, began to release political prisoners in August of this year, and on December 5, 1998, Nigerians voted in democratic local elections. 49' The
elections, generally recognized as "credible," are the first in a series
of scheduled elections designed to bring democracy to the highest
and lowest levels of governance in Nigeria. 492 Not until this process is
complete will Nigeria's self-appointed role as regional defender of
democracy be legitimized.

491. See James Rupert, Democracy Activists Applaud Nigerian Vote, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at A23.
492. See Nigeria'sLong Road Back to Democracy, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1998,
at 45.

